La gestion des risques des projets en partenariat public-privé en Chine : une étude de cas : le stade "nid d'oiseau" à Pékin by Jing, Jia
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À RIMOUSKI 
La gestion des risques des projets en partenariat public-privé en 
Chine: une étude de cas 
Le stade "nid d'oiseau" à Pékin 
MÉMOIRE 
PRESENTE À 
L'UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À RIMOUSKI 
dans le cadre du programme de la maîtrise en gestion de projet 
en vue de l' obtention du grade de maître ès sciences 
PAR 
Jia Jing 
Mai 2012 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À RIMOUSKI 
Service de la bibliothèque 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avertissement 
 
 
 
La diffusion de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse se fait dans le respect des droits de son 
auteur, qui a signé le formulaire « Autorisation de reproduire et de diffuser un rapport, 
un mémoire ou une thèse ». En signant ce formulaire, l’auteur concède à l’Université du 
Québec à Rimouski une licence non exclusive d’utilisation et de publication de la totalité 
ou d’une partie importante de son travail de recherche pour des fins pédagogiques et non 
commerciales. Plus précisément, l’auteur autorise l’Université du Québec à Rimouski à 
reproduire, diffuser, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de son travail de recherche à 
des fins non commerciales sur quelque support que ce soit, y compris l’Internet. Cette 
licence et cette autorisation n’entraînent pas une renonciation de la part de l’auteur à ses 
droits moraux ni à ses droits de propriété intellectuelle. Sauf entente contraire, l’auteur 
conserve la liberté de diffuser et de commercialiser ou non ce travail dont il possède un 
exemplaire. 
 
 
11 
Composition du jury : 
Monsieur Farid Ben Hassel, président du jury, Université du Québec à Rimouski 
Monsieur Didier Urli, directeur de recherche, Université du Québec à Rimouski 
Monsieur Tianyin Wu, examinateur externe, Nantong Université, Ch ine 
Dépôt initial le 1 Mai 20 12 Dépôt final le 30 Mai 20 12 
IV 
RE1l1ERCIEMENTS 
Je tiens à remerc ier le professeur Didier Urli de m 'avoir encadrée pour ces travaux 
de recherche. Ses conseil s et son enthousiasme se sont révé lés agréables et déterminants. Je 
remercie les professeurs Shouqin Wang et Tieying Wu pour leur di sponibilité et leur aide 
précieuse. 
Je salue les gens qui de près ou de loin m'ont permi s de vivre cette fo rmidable 
expéri ence à Beijing et à Nangtong : Yuntian Shen, Beibei Cao, Yife i Cui et les nombreux 
autres. Je salue également le corps professoral du programme de maîtri se en gestion de 
projet qui a su cultiver en moi un intérêt grandi ssant pour cette di scipline nouve ll e pour 
moi, ainsi que les étudiants du programme de maîtri se, dont le soutien et la présence se sont 
révélés précieux et stimulants. 
Merci enfin à ceux qui m'ont encouragée et soutenue dans ma démarche et to ut au 
long de ma vie québécoise. 
Vlll 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le partenari at public-privé (PPP) est une méthode de gesti on de proj et qu i est de 
plus en plus utili sée dans les projets de constructi on d 'infras tructures en Chine. La gest ion 
des risques es t d'une grande importance dans la réuss ite de ce type de proj ets. Par le biais 
d ' une étude du projet du stade olympique, ce mémoire vise à explorer les facteurs de 
risque, la façon dont les risques sont attribués et partagés efficacement entre le secteur 
public et privé, ainsi que les problèmes rencontrés dans la gestion du risque au sein des 
projets PPP en Chine. D'une part, une enquête Delphi a été menée avec des responsables 
des secteurs publics et privés qui ont participé à la gestion de ce proj et visant à identifier, 
classer et répartir les ri sques; d'autre part, une entrevue avec un expert sur la gestion des 
risques des proj ets de PPP en Chine a été développée pour di scuter de la situation actuell e 
et des principaux pro blèmes de gesti on des ri sques dans le cadre de proj ets PPP en Chine. 
A u sein du proj et PPP auque l nous nous inté ressons, 44 ri sques ont été identifiés, parmi 
lesquels 14 ont été attribués au secteur public et 18 pour le secteur privé, tandis que les 12 
restants ont été identifi és comme équitablement partagés. Sept ri sques majeurs, y compris 
les ri sques de concepti on, de retard dans la construction , de dépassement des co ûts de 
construction, les changements de la demande du marché, d'insuffi sance de connaissance 
des ri sques, d 'organi sation et de coordination, d 'échanges avec l'étranger et de 
convertibili té ont été identifiés et expliqués pour ce projet en particulier. 
Il a égalem ent été constaté que, comparativement avec les résultats issus de 
recherches antérieures, dans le proj et " N id d 'o iseau ", les ri sques étaient surtout attribués 
au secteur pri vé tandis que dans les pays occ identaux, le transfert des risques est effectué 
avec encore moins de succès. Les résultats de la recherche peuvent contri buer à des 
proj ets s imilaires de PPP, en particuli er pour la construction des install ations sportives. 
Mots clés : le partenariat public-privé (PPP), la ges ti on des ri sques, Chine, Stade 
N id d'o iseau 
x 
A BSTRACT 
The Public-Private Partnership, otherwise known as PPP, is a method of management 
of project which is increasingly used in infrastructure construction projects in China. The 
ri sk management is of great importance in the success of such kind of projects. Through a 
case study of the Bird Nest Stadium Project for 2008Beijing Olympic, this paperwork aims 
to exp lore the risks factors in the project, how the risks are allocated and shared effectively 
between public and private sectors, as weil as the problems encountered in the ri sk 
management in Chinais PPP projects. On the one hand, a tow-round Delphi survey was 
conducted with the managers from both public and private sectors who participated in the 
management of this proj ect to identify, rank and allocate the risks; On the other hand , an 
interview with an expert on the risk management of ppp projects in China was developed 
to discuss the present situation and the main problems of the risk management of ppp 
projects in China. In this typical PPP project, 44 risks were identified, among which 14 
were a llocated more to the public sector and 18 to the private, wh ile the rest 12 were 
considered to be equally shared. 7 top high risks including Design Ri sk, Construction 
Delay, Construction Co st Overrun, Market Demand Change , Inadequacy of Knowledge, 
Organization and Coordination Risk and Foreign Exchange and Convertibility were 
identified and explained for this particular project. Tt was also found that compared with the 
previous research results of the ri sk management of PPP projects in China, risks were more 
transferred to the private sector in the Bird Nest Project; while compared with that in 
western countries, the risk transferring is still less successfu l. The research findings may 
contribute to the similar PPP projects, especially fo r the fac ilities ' construction for the 
further Olympic Games. 
Keywords : Pub li c-P rivate Partnership (PPP) , risk management, China, Bird Nest 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the ppp is becoming more and more popular and important in China, a lot of 
research has been done on thi s subj ect. However, ail the previous research had put its foc us 
on the overall applicati on and implementation of PPP, which only provided the general 
descripti on of the situati on of PPP projects in China. The research in thi s paperwork aims 
to focus on the risk management of one single PPP proj ect in China- the Bird Nest Stadium 
of 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, of which the research results may be useful and meaning 
fo r a series of PPP projects for large sports or art events, for example, the upcoming 20 12 
London Olympic Games. 
In thi s case stud y, both the quantitati ve and the qualitati ve research methods will be 
applied . Firstl y, a questionnaire wi ll be deve loped in order to find out ail ri sk fac tors 
encountered in thi s PPP proj ects and will also be ranked according to their levels of 
influence in thi s proj ect. Secondly, sorne particular ri sks in thi s project wi ll be analyzed so 
that special attention would be paid and some precaution would be made fo r the future 
proj ects which have simi lariti es with thi s one. F inall y, an interview with an expert in the 
PPP research in China will be presented to give a more comprehensive understanding and 
exp lanati on of the problems worthy of discussion in both thi s project, as weil as ail other 
PPP projects in China. 
Chapter 1 serves to deve lop and to introduce the theme and the background of thi s 
study, as we il as the speci fic reasons that draw our attentions to the PPP. A simple 
presentation of the worldwide hi story of PPP, as weil as the development of PPP in China 
will be given in thi s chapter. 
In chapter 2, a literature review regardin g the risk management of PPP in China will 
be prov ided. First ly, we will focus on a definiti on of PPP concepti on. Secondly, we wi ll 
give a general introd uction of the risk management in PPP projects , including the 
characterist ics , content, as weI l as the ClllTent situation of the practice of risk management 
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used in ppp projects. Finally, we will continue to a deeper explanation of risk management 
in PPP, elaborating the risk identification and allocation, analyzing the risk factors of both 
public partners and private partners, and the methods of mitigating the risks of ppp 
projects. 
Chapter 3 is the essence of this study. A case study of the Bird Nest Stadium Project 
for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games will be conducted in order to find out how the risks are 
managed in the ppp projects in China. Firstly, the background of the project will be 
introduced. Then a tow-round Delphi survey will be conducted with the managers from 
both public and private sectors, who participated in the management of this project to 
identify, rank and allocate the risks; an interview with an expert on the risk management of 
ppp projects in China will be developed to discuss the present situation and the main 
problems of the risk management of ppp projects in China. The transcript of the interview 
will be attached in the annex. 
A discussion around the case study will be developed in chapter 4. The sharing and 
the allocation of the risks in this project will be analyzed. The specific risks and the highest 
risk factors in this particular project will be explained. The comparisons of risk 
management between this paliicular project and othel' ppp pl'ojects in China, as well as 
between that of China and other western countries will be conducted. 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL THEME OF RESEARCH 
It is being reported that nowadays, in China, the traditional modes of tinancing can no 
longer meet the growing needs of the fast development of infrastructure construction. On 
the one hand, the government has been putting more emphasis on the construction of 
infras tructure projects with a large amount of funds injected, which accordingly increase 
the tinancial burden of Chinese government. While on the other hand, a large part of the 
domestic private capital has been keeping in an unused status. As a matter of fact, the 
bringing of ppp (public-private partnerships) tinancing mode is a perfect method of so lving 
thi s dil emma. In the tirst chapter, a brief introduction of the application of ppp mode both 
in international projects and in China's domestic projects will be given before we proceed 
to our unique research objective - the management of risks in ppp projects . 
1.1 Research Background 
With the continuous injection of funds for the country 's infrastructure construction, 
which is about up to four tril lion Chinese dollars, the pace of development in China' s 
infras tructure construction is de veloping with a rapid speed. The traditional mode of 
tinancing public infrastructure cannot meel: the huge demand for funds. The government is 
facing a huge financial pressure, whereas the domestic private capital is comparatively in 
an idle status. However, the bringing up of ppp (Public Private Partnership) mode is almost 
a perfect so lution for this dilemma. 
The PPP model was tirst proposed by the United Kingdom, and has been widely used 
in countri es aIl over the world. Up until now, there is no uniform detinition for PPP, but 
people have reached sorn e consensus about the PPP mode as follows: 
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• The ppp is a partnership developed between the public and the private sectors 
which takes full advantage of the respecti ve advantages of both the gove rnm en t and private 
organizat ions. 
• The ppp mode combines the government ' s coordinating ability, long-term planning 
capacity, soc ial res ponsibility and the private parties ' entrepreneurship, financial support, 
technology and management efficiency together as one. Under the government 's guidance 
and supervis ion , as weil as its financial suppoli, the privatization is adopted in the 
management of project during the project's construction and operation periods. 
• The nature of the ppp mode is the introduction of private capital in the field of 
public utiliti es. A bidding process will be used to select the best investors, builders and 
operato rs. 
• Under the premise of ensuring the quality of public services, to share sorne of cost 
of the proj ect' s construction and operation with the government is the main purpose of the 
ppp mode. 
In ppp projects , the government brings in the private investment. In the negotiating 
process, the cooperati ve relationship between the two sectors is faced with the prob lem of 
risk sharin g. The Government intends to pass as many as possible the ri sks to the private 
sector; meanwhile the private sector is willing to bear the corresponding ri sks considering 
of profi tability from the project. However, this transfer of risks is not unlimited. The private 
investors can only afford part of the risks to a certain extend. If the risk is beyond the 
private sector 's control , it will eventually lead to the failure of the project. On the contrary, 
if private enterpri ses can only take a small part of the risks , its investment of the project 
cannot bring back a sati sfactory return. This will force the private investors to finall y give 
up the proj ect, and to turn to investing the higher- yielding projects instead . Thus, the key 
factor of the success of ppp projects is to well manage the projects ' risks and to share them 
in a reasonable way. 
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1.2 Situation in China 
8ased on the research report given by China Policy Institute, the ppp developed in 
China following the steps presented in the table below (Cheng & Wang, 2009): 
Table 1 : Development of ppp in China 
Year Event 
1980s ppp mode was transplanted into China. 
The mid- 1 980s 
The first successful ppp project B power project 
In Shenzhen, under cooperation with a Hong Kong 
(the first stage of ppp company. 
development) 
The mid-1990s 
(the fi rst ppp boom) 
Many ppp projects In the power and water 
sectors, such as the Laibin B power project in Guangxi , 
the water project in Chengdu, the power project in 
Changsha etc. 
~-------------------------r----------------------------------------~ 
From 1995 to 2000 
The end of the 1990s 
The establi shment of the initial ppp leagal 
framework in China. A series of policies and statues 
were issued and carried out to regulate the boom in ppp 
projects. 
Public funds were invested in infrastructure under 
the positive financial policy of China; the central 
(the fi rst wave of ppp govemment started to demolish illegal ppp projects in 
investments ended) local places. 
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The early 2000s 
The re-emergence of a bottleneck effec t of 
infrastructure on economlC deve lopment which 
provided a chance for the use of ppp 111 the 
infrastructure area aga111. Two prominent policies 
directing ppp deve lopment: 1. The Method of 
(the second wave of ppp Managing Urban Public Utility Concessions (2004) , 
started) 
2005 
which lays down specifie legal directions fo r urban 
infrastructure; 2. The Dec ision on refo rming investment 
scheme (2004) , which relaxed the approval procedure 
for private investment and opened more sectors to 
investment. 
The first central government policy called 
"Opinion of the State Council" was issued to allow the 
entry of the private sector into the area of power, 
communications, railway, a irline, and petrol eum. 
l.3 New Problems rai sed in Research 
As the PPP is becoming more and more popular and important in China, a lot of 
research has been done on this subject. However, ail the previous research had put its focus 
on the overall application and implementation of PPP, which only provided the general 
description of the situation of PPP projects in China. This comparatively large research 
range may result in the ignoring of some details and a lack of the particularity of proj ects 
with their unique characteristics. Neveliheless, my research aims to fOCLts on the ri sk 
management of one single PPP project in China- the Bird Nest Stadium of 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games , of which the research results may be useful and meaning for a series of 
PPP projects for large sports or art events, for example, the upcoming 2012 London 
Olympie Games. 
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This is a large-scale ppp project with a wo.rldwide awareness and influence, which is 
also. a very typical case of ppp project in China. Because o.f its large scale and wo.rldwide 
significance, this pro.ject has drawn a high attention o.f Chinese go.vernment. A Large 
amo.unt o.f funds has been invested into. the project and a te am o.f elites with abundant 
experience and kno.wledge o.f ppp projects has been cho.sen to. acco.mplish this task. Thus, 
we can co.nclude that this project is a very representative o.ne o.f ppp projects in China. 
Co.nsequently, a deep study and detailed analysis o.f risk management o.f thi s project can 
indicate the present situatio.n o.f risk management o.f ppp projects in China. Meanwhile, the 
study o.f the case will also. help find o.ut the sho.rtage and problems in the risk management 
o.f ppp pro.jects in China. 
In this case study, bo.th the quantitative and the qualitative research metho.ds will be 
applied. Firstly, a questio.nnaire will be develo.ped in o.rder to. find o.ut ail risk facto.rs 
enco.untered in this ppp projects and will also. be ranked acco.rding to. their levels o.f 
influence in this pro.ject. Seco.ndly, so.me particular risks in this project will be analyzed So. 
that special attentio.n wo.uld be paid and so.me precautio.n wo.uld be made fo.r the future 
projects which have similarities with this o.ne. Finally, an interview with an expert in the 
ppp research in China will be presented to. give a mo.re co.mprehensive understanding and 
explanatio.n o.f the pro.blems wo.rthy o.f discussio.n in bo.th thi s pro.ject, as weil as ail o.ther 
ppp pro.j ects in China. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As is mentioned above, this thesis aims to provide a description of the use of ppp 
projects in China and to give a research of the application of risk management of ppp 
projects in China. 
In fact, the Public-Private Pal1nership mode has been applied in China since many 
years ago and there are hundreds of successful cases in China using this ppp mode. 
Moreover, this new mode is becoming more and more popular and is being used more often 
in the projects carried out in China, which offered us a large date-base of this research . We 
will now highlight the topics already explored as weil as the underlying issues through a 
review of the literature on thi s topic . 
Firstly, we will focus on a definition of ppp conception. Secondly, we will give a 
general introduction of the ri sk management in ppp projects, including the characteristics, 
content, as weil as the current situation of the practice of risk management used in ppp 
projects. Finally, we will continue to a deeper explanation of risk management in PPP, 
elaborating the risk identification and allocation, analyzing the risk factors of both public 
partners and private partners, and the methods of mitigating the risks of PPP projects. 
2.1 Define PPP 
2.1.1 DEFINITION OF ppp 
The terminology PPP is the abbreviation of Public-Private Pal1nership, which 
describes the involvement of the private sector's participation in any or ail phases of a 
public service. In this mode of partnership, the public sector provides public goods and 
services through the collaborating with the private sector. In the eyes of the public op inion, 
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the public-private partnership represents a very vague notion. Because of the differences in 
ideology and culture, countries around the world can hardly reach a consensus on the 
definition of PPP. The term PPP has become complicated over the last 20 years, which has 
been gradually turned into a phenomenon encompassing several types of collaborations . 
Since the contents and objectives of PPP vary in accordance with the country's 
unique feature and specifie culture, different country has its own definition of the PPP term. 
For example, according to the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnership , the 
definition of ppp is marked as: 
" public-private palinership carries a specifie meaning in the Canadian context. 
First, it relates to the provision of public services or public infrastructure. Second, 
it necessitates the transfer ofrisk between partners."(Cheng & Wang, 2009) 
The definition embraced bl' The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships is 
as foUows: 
"A cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the 
expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards." 
Another ex ample, the official definition of PPP by the "Federal Report on ppp in 
Public Real Estate, Part I: Guideline", commissioned by the German Federal Department of 
TranSpotiation, Construction and Real Estate (BMYBW) in 2003, is as follows: 
"The term PPP refers to a long-term, contractually regulated cooperation between 
the public and private sector for the efficient fulfillment of public tasks in 
combining the necessary resources (knowhow, operational funds, capital, 
personnel) of the partners and distributing existing project risks appropriately 
acco rding to the risk management competence of the project partners. " (Alfen et 
al.,2009) 
Besides, a summary of some recent definitions for PPP are given as follows: 
29 
1) "PPPs are aimed at increasing the effici ency of in frastructure projects by means of a 
long-term co ll aboration between the public sector and private bus iness. A holi stic 
approach which extends over the entire lifecyc le is impOliant here." (Alfen & 
Barckhahn, 2012 ) 
2) "The term public-private partnership ("PPP") is not defined at Community level. In 
general , the term refers to forms of cooperation between publi c authoriti es and the 
world of business which aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, 
management and maintenance of an infrastructure of the provis ion of a service." 
(Hodge & Greve, 2007) 
3) " Standard & Poor 's definition of a PPP is any medium-to-Iong term relationship 
between the public and private sectors, invo lving the sharing of risks and rewards of 
multi sector ski Il s, expertise and finance to deliver desired policy outcomes. " 
(Caselli , Buscaino, Corie lli , & Gatti , 20 10) 
4) "PPPs are long-term partnerships to deliver as sets and services underpinning public 
services and community outcomes. Optimal structuring links private sector 
profitability to sustained performance over the long-term, yielding robust and 
attract ive cash-flows for investors in return for de liveri ng better value for money to 
the taxpayer. " (Bo ussabaine, 2006) 
5) "' Public-Private Partnership ' is a generic term for the relationships formed between 
the private sector and public bodies often with the aim of introducing private sector 
resources and/or expertise in order to help provide and deliver publ ic sector as sets 
and serv ices. The term PPP is , thus, used to describe a wide variety of working 
arrangements from loose, informai and strategie partnerships, to design bui ld 
finance and operate (DBFO) type service contracts and formaI joint venture 
companies." (De lmon, 20 Il ) 
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2.1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF ppp 
ppp mode has now been widely used in ail over the world. Generally speaking, in 
industrialized countries such as England , Germany etc. , ppp is applied in the field of public 
service provision, for example, education, health service, waste management etc. ; whereas 
in developing countries in large demand for basic infrastructure, for example, in China, 
PPPs are often used in large-scale projects, including the power, express ways, water 
supply instruction projects, in order to stimulate the rapid development and growth of the 
countries' economic . 
However, different types of PPPs tend to share sorne common characteristics (G . 
Hodge, 2009). As it is indicated in the ppp handbook published by European Investment 
Bank, the ppp mode has four main characteristics as follows: (Uppenberg, Strauss, & 
Wagenvoort, 2011) 
• Ri sks and responsibilities are shared between the public and the private sectors in 
order to gain efficienc y, co st reliability and financia l security; 
• Public service and ultimate regulatory responsibility remain in public sector while 
the private sector undertakes that for implementation; transfer tasks and 
responsibility for the provision of infrastructure to the private sector; 
• Rel ati vely long term contractual relationship between the public and the private 
part ies on different aspects of a planned project ; 
• lnvolve the private sector in the provision of public services; innovation 111 
particular through output specification, service level s and payment mechani sms for 
public sector services to be supplied. 
More briefly, in an evaluation report on projects financed by the EIB (Crescenzi & 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2008), a set of ppp characteristics were agreed by the evaluators as below, 
namely a ppp should meet the requests: 
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• lnvolve a clearl y defined projeet. 
• lnvolve the sharing of ri sks with the private seetor. 
• Be based on a eontraetual relationship whieh is limited in time. 
• Have a elear separation between the public sector and the borrower, i.e. there should 
be a private-seetor party raising proj ect-finance based debt. 
2.1.3 AOVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ppp 
Fi rst of ail , as Juli e O 'Neil, the Seeretary General of the Iri sh Oepartment of 
Transport at the ppp Transport Summit in 2005 , "PPPs make additio nal projeets affordable . 
By attracting private seetor finance for sehemes suited to the ppp model, limited public 
seetor funds ean be directed to deliver other non-PPP projects. " (Baindur & Kamath, 2009) . 
One of the most important benefits brought by the partnership with the public sector is that 
with the private sector's financial support, PPPs make projects affordable when the public 
seetor eannot finance the project by itself or cannot increase its direct levels of borrowing. 
Seeond ly, using the PPP mode ean maximize the use of private skills and 
technologies. Aeeordin g to the report of PPP projects in Europe made by Paul Oavies and 
Kathryn Eustice in 2005 , under the PPP proeurement, the private seetor is not only required 
to deliver assets on time and budget on the service leve ls required by the public sector, but 
the private seetor should also ensure that the individual assets and other elements of the 
proj eet that have been proeured work together to suecessfu ll y deliver services. Meanwhile, 
the private sector should maintain and refurbish assets on an effective basis, in order that 
services are delivered continuously at satisfaetory leve ls over the long-term . Therefore, PPP 
mode offer significant opportunities to benefit from private sector resulted from these 
specifie requirements under the mode. 
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Thirdly, the ppp mode can transfer part of risks to the private sector. Under PPPs, the 
pri vate sector takes life cycle cost risk and ail the risks are allocated to the party best able to 
manage or absorb each particular risk (Baindur & Kamath, 2009). Since under the PPP, one 
of the public sector's aims is to seek the best value over the life of the asset and the project, 
the private sector is required to focus on the design and the implementation of the project 
with a view to their long-term cost to the taxpayer instead of the immediate capital spend. 
Therefore, the private sector has been devoted to the increasing of skills of analyzing and 
providing for life cycle costs accordingly, so that the life cycle risks are absorbed by the 
pri vate sector. Furthermore, PPPs are designed so that risks are allocated to the party which 
is best able to manage them (Baindur & Kamath, 2009). Because of the participation of the 
private sector with the necessary long-term project skills, the risks associated with project 
delivery will automatically be transferred to the private sector who can manage them better. 
Thus, the public sector would accordingly achieved best value as the private sector brings 
in the expeî'tise to manage or absorb the risks, and makes the pricing more economically 
and minimizing the costs of the project. 
Last but not the least, as is concluded in the Case Studies of PPPs in Infrastructure 
Development from Asia and Europe by EU-Asia PPP Network, the PPPs not only remove 
the responsibility of funding the investment from the government ' s balance sheet and adopt 
manage rial practices and experience of the private sector, but also introduce helpfuJ 
competitions and enhance the project's efficiency as weIl. According to the EU-Asia report, 
it was estimated that, in the UK, the adoption of PPP mode had produce average savings of 
17% to 25% over ail sectors during the past ten years (Alfen et al., 2009) . 
On the other side, PPPs do have their limitations and restrictions ll1 their 
implementations in the meantime. According to the report in the European Transport 
Conference in 2002, the most import disadvantage of the PPP mode is the increased 
transaction costs, which is a result of the complexity of the relations between the diverse 
actors and because of the long duration of these relations. And other important 
disadvantages are the higher capital costs, the insecurity of being granted the concession, 
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the culture gap between the two sectors and the holdup problem (Bank & Facility, 2003). 
Moreover, as it was mentioned in the presentation of PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advi sory Facility) in 2005, the disadvantages of the ppp mode were concluded as below 
(Bank & Facility, 2(03): 
• Poss ible conflict between planning and environmental considerations; 
• May increase operational risk, co st of re-ente ring the business if operator proves 
unsatisfactory; 
• Commissioning stage is critical ; contracts are more complex and tendering process 
can take longer; contract management and performance monitoring systems 
required ; 
• Limited incentive for whole life costing approach to design 
• Ooes not attract private finance and commits public sector to providing long term 
finance . 
2.2 Risk Management of PPP 
Risk, as per Webster 's dictionary, is defined as the possibility of loss, in jury, 
di sadvantage, or destruction. It is told by both the ory and experience that risk management 
is critical for PPP efficiency. First of ail , the appropriate risk allocation is essential for PPP 
efficiency ; the risk allocation clauses are critical during procurement and the risks must be 
properl y managed during the whole life of the PPP project's contract. Besides, risk 
allocation should be carefully addressed from the outset of the contract; the risks should be 
managed by the project leader during procurement and even after the contract is cJosed, the 
contract manager should address the ri sk management as the risk management is sti ll 
critical. Therefore, in general terms, risk management is at the core of PPP procurement 
(Monteiro , 2(05) . 
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Risk management is an ongoing process throughout the lifecycle of the entire project. 
The process of risk management can be broken down into the following activities (Kraman 
& Hamm, 1999): 
Risk Identification: It IS the process of identifying ail the risks relevant to the 
project. 
Risk Assessment: It refers to determination of the degree of likelihood of the risks 
and the possi ble consequence if the risk occurs. 
Risk Allocation: Assigning the responsibility of the consequence of the risk to one 
or more of the parties to the contract. 
Risk Mitigation: The process of controlling the likelihood of occurrence of risk 
and/or the extent of the consequence of the risk. 
As is indicated by the EU-Asia ppp network III their study of ppp projects III 
infrastructure development, it is agreed that from a ppp project perspective, the realization 
of different risks over the lifecycle of the project can crea te different scenarios where 
project benefits and costs can differ greatly from the projected base conditions. Thus, the 
identification, assessment and management of the risks associated with the project that can 
threaten the project capability to provide sufficient revenues to service the debt obligations 
and earn return on equity investments have been of paramount importance in procuring 
infrastructure projects through ppp route (Alfen et aL, 2009). 
2.2.1 RISK CLASSIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION IN ppp PROJECTS 
The techniques of risk identification in ppp projects should be based on the 
specialized knowledge of experts and related experience in the projects with similar 
llniqueness as PPPs. It is hard to summarize the certain risks shared by ail ppp projects due 
to a nllmber of factors affecting the ppp projects, such as the location and environment of 
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the project, the type of the project's outcome, the culture and society sUlTounding the 
project, etc. 
Above all, the ri sks which are typical of ppp projects can be broadly classified into 
two main categories (De Jong, Mu, Stead, Ma, & Xi, 2010). The first group is General or 
country specific risks, which are the risks mostly associated with the political , social, 
economic, and environmental situations in the host countries; the promoter of the project 
have no control over ri sks in this category. The second group includes the project specific 
risks. These risks are more related to the project itself and the project sponsors can control 
and manage them to certain extend . 
Besides, the first group, general or country specific ri sks can be further divided into 
three major levels, including country political level risks, country commercial risks and 
country legal risks; while the second group, project specific risks can be divided into three 
phases in accordance with the three stages along the project's lifecyc le, including the 
development phase, construction phase and operating phase (Alfen et al., 2009). Each risk 
categorized in both the two groups is also defined in the report as li sted in the table below: 
Table 2 : Risk Classification in ppp 
Group 
Risk Name Risk Definition 
Name 
Risks associated with political support, state's 
PoliticaJ risks taxation, nationalization, expropriation, 
The 
import/export restrictions etc. 
general or 
country Country Risks concerned with convertibility of 
specific commercial risks exchanging rate, inflation, foreign interest etc. 
risks 
Country legal Risks related to changes 111 laws and 
risks regulation, the enforceability of contracts, 
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compensation etc. 
- Bidding risk which refers to the loss of the 
expenditures resulted from losing the tender 
to other bidders. 
Development phase 
- Delay in planning risk 
- Approval risk. 
Project - Construction co st overrun risk; 
specific Construction phase - Construction time delay; 
risks 
- Failure to achieve completion. 
- Technical risk; 
- Oemand risk ; 
Operating phase 
- Force majeure risk; 
- Revenue risk. 
2.2.2 CHARACTERJSTlCS OF RJSKS IN ppp PROJECTS 
Risk refers to the uncertainty of future behavior of the deci sion-making and obj ective 
conditions which led to a variety of deviation from the possible results related to people's 
interests, as well as differences from the original anticipation. Risk exists in ail human 
social and economic activities. ppp project financing operations, of course, is no exception. 
The risks of the ppp model are the risks, under the ppp mode, which may occur within the 
life cycle of the project and generate the uncertain impact of interference towards the 
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project's financing, construction and operations; or may lead to the loss or damage to the 
project, or even reslilting in the event of project ' s faillire. 
Under the ppp mode, in addition of having the characteristics of the general risks of 
the project, sllch as objecti vity, llni versality, di versity etc. , ri sks in ppp proj ects also show 
the fo llowing characteristics: 
1. Ri sks have long life cycle 
Normally ppp projects are Large-scale projects with a large amount of investment. 
The required payback period for ppp Project Company to recover the costs, such as the 
repayment of bank loans of financial institutions is assumed to be longer. Therefore, the 
project risk ' life cycle will be longer. 
2. Ri sks with remarkable periodic feature 
Along the development of the construction of the proj ect, the risk of ppp financing 
presents obvious periodic features , which mainly referred to the following two aspects: 
1) ppp financing model at different stages, the size of the proj ect ri sk 
showing obvious stages. For example, in the proj ect construction 
process, a lot of money for the purchase of engineering equipment, 
building materials, payment of construction costs , interest on loans from 
banks are calculated in the project's capital co st as the project has not yet 
generate any income. Thus, with the continued investment of funds, the 
risk related to the ability to repay ail the debts is also growing. When the 
project operation period starts , thi s repayment risk will become sm all er 
and smaller since stable cash income is generated and the repay of bank 
loans can be executed. 
2) The main types of risk faced by the different stages of the ppp financin g 
are also changing in accordance with the project ' s development. Some of 
the ri sks exist in a particular phase of the project, whereas some risks 
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stay th ro ughout the pl'oject. During the construction phase, the mam 
risks is the completi on ri sk, while during the operational phase of the 
proj ect, the main ri sks includes risks such as competitive risk, market 
risk etc . Throughout the operation of the ppp mode, risks such as policy 
l'i sk, legal ri sk will exist along the whole life cycle of the project. 
3. Each party invo lved in the project has its own characteri zed ri sks . 
In ppp projects, since each party involved has different and its proper interest, the 
risk that each party will face in the proj ect will also not be the same. For the government, as 
they do not need a direct investment or require little capital investment, in the constructi on 
of infrastructure projects, the main risks they should bear include: choose the wro ng or non-
qualified private pat1ners which results in delay or failure in project financing process; the 
economic loss and soci al loss due to the non-standardizati on or time delay of the 
cotupletion of the project; the 1055 causcd by poor project manageûlent or imprûper 
maintenance afte r the project 's outcome is transferred. For private investors, the purpose of 
their investment in the project is to get an adequate return. They, therefore, assume more 
risks within longer peri od . The main risks the private partners should undertake in the 
project include: nati onal po li cy and regul atory changes lead to increase the cost of the 
project li fe cycles; not get a satisfactory return on in vestment afte l' the completion of the 
project etc. For banks and other fi nancial institutions, their target is to recover the full loan 
and earn interest. Therefore, the uncertainties in the proj ect constructi on and operati on 
processes may ail lead to project delay or fa ilure, and will also have impacts on lenders. 
4. More complicated ri sks invo lved . 
Although diffe rent types of ppp projects have different organizational structure, 
however a basic ppp financial project invo lves at least parties such as government and 
re levant departments, the ppp project company, shareholders, creditors, the design side , the 
construction side, the suppl y sidc, operators, insurance companies, and the users of the 
product or service. ln this way, as fo r the entire project, including the fïnancing, des ign, 
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construction and operation processes, as weIl as the pro cess of transferring to the 
Government, each of the above process is completed by the participant who is responsible 
for that. Sorne participants may play several roles at the same time. And all participants 
must have co-ordination and mutual understanding among each other throughout the whole 
concess ion period in order to achieve the successful completion of the project. Compared 
with the general project, the embodiment of government participation and government 
interests makes the allocation of risk of ppp financing mode more complex. Indirect risks, 
such as inflation, changes in interest rates, political instability, policy discontinuity, the 
differences of local government departments, the inconsistence of local and central 
government views, the corruption of government departments , may all affect the 
construction and operation of the project, and may even lead to the full or partial 
nationalization of the investments from the investors. 
2.2.3 RISK SHARING AND ALLOCATION IN ppp 
What makes the ppp mode different from the traditional financing mode is that, 
under PPP, sorne of the risks are transferred to and shared by the private sector. The 
principle of risk allocation in ppp mode is that risks should be borne by the party who best 
can manage them or bear them with the lowest cost. However, it is much more complicated 
to weIl allocate the risks between parties in practice regardless this simple principle. Based 
on the Annual Basic Plan for Private Participation in infrastructure report, another several 
principles and rules of how to weil share the risks in PPP projects were concluded as below 
(ILORI, 2004): 
• Risks belonged to PPP project implementation shall be classifi ed based on the cause 
as attributable 1) to the government, 2) to the concessionaire, and 3) to force 
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• The competent enterprise or company, at the time of announcing the request for 
proposai or proposai content for unsolicited ppp projects, should include 
information on risk types, risk classifications etc. This measure will allow the 
concessionaire to make forecasts of the risks involved in the ppp project 
implementation. 
• The risks which are foreseeable as weil as the risk which can be insured should be 
handled by insurance as much as possible . Besides, the losses or added expenses 
that cannot be covered by insurance shall be allocated through negotiation by and 
within the negotiating parties . 
• The party who is responsible for the risk must be clearly outlined 111 order to 
conclude the concession agreement. 
Risks attributable to the government shall be borne by the government, 
while risks attributable to the private investors should be borne by the 
pri vate sector. 
For risks related to the force majeure, the allocation ratio should be mutually 
agreed and decided upon in the light of their specific characteristics. 
Neither govermnent nor the private investors may request additional user fee 
adjustment or compensation for loss on the grounds of the party's own ri sk 
allocation. 
2.2.4 MITIGATION STRATEGIES OF RISKS IN ppp 
Based on a report of Risk Management in ppp Projects (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002), the 
main ri sks types, the reason of the risks occurrence in the projects and how to mitigate the 
risks are conclude in the following table: 
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Table 3 : Mitigation of Risks in ppp 
What risk? Why has it? How to mitigate? 
Time and co st High capital intensity - Engineering, procurement, and 
overruns or shortfall and a relatively long construction contracts to an 
in performance construction period experienced and reputed finn ; 
- Provisions for liquidated 
damages in the contracts. 
Technical problems Technology is untried - Entrusting operation to 
during the project's or is changing rapidly ex perienced operations and 
operational phase or inabili ty of the maintenance contractors ; 
operator to manage 
Provisions for liquidated -
such big and complex 
damages in the contracts; 
project. 
- Insurance against force majeure 
risks. 
Market conditions U ncertainty in the Investors enter into a contract with the 
assumed in forecas t of the demand monopoly purchaser to guarantee a 
determi ning the projections minimum leve l of purchase. 
viability of the 
project not realized 
Interest rate changes High capital intensity - Pass it on to consumers , for 
with large impact and example, in arrangements in 
long payback periods which the impact of interest rate 
with which risks spread variations on unit costs are 
over a long time. treated as a pass-through into 
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the tariff; 
- Using hedging instruments 
Risk of not being Financial condition of - Long term solution is to 
paid for services public sector utilities in improve the financial condition 
delivered deve loping countries is of the utilities by improvement 
often weak. And these in efficiencies or privatizat ion ; 
utilities are often the 
- Short term, guarantee and 
monopoly and large 
counter guarantee by state and 
buyers of the project ' s 
central government; 
outcomes. 
- Set up an escrow arrangement. 
Disruption in Infrastructure projects Establishing strong and independent 
construction or have to interface with regulatory authorities which can 
operation of the various regulatory operate with maximum transparency of 
project due to authorities throughout procedures within a legal framework 
regulatory changes. the life of the project, that provides investors with credible 
making them especially resources against arbitrary ac tion. 
vulnerable to 
regulatory action. 
Disruption in Infrastructure projects Partially mitigated through political 
construction or have high visibility risk insurance offered by multilateral 
operation of a with a strong element organizations, such as the multilateral 
proj ect due to of public interest, investment guarantee agency, or 
political decisions. which makes it bilateral investment protection 
vulnerable to political agreements. 
action that can interrupt 
or upset settled 
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commercial tenns or 
even lead to 
cancellation of licenses 
or nationalization. 
2.3 Risk Management of ppp in China 
From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the initi al legal and policy framework of the 
Public-Private Partnership has been formed in China (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). 
However, due to China's specifie national conditions as a developing country, the 
app lication and implementation of ppp in China has been facing a lot of challenges. For 
example, the state dominance which lead to the private parties' power and right being 
impaired ; the legal and administrative frameworks which result it a complex regulatory 
regime; the state monopoly which limits the public participation etc. Although because of 
the continually growing economy in China, the role of ppp will be keeping expanding in 
the near future , there ' s still a long way for the ppp mode to develop into a mature fo rm of 
governance and a new relationship between the government, the private investors, as weil 
as the public. A more comprehensive institutional improvement, not only in terms of 
government capacity and national legislation, but also in public accountability is required 
for the fU11her development of ppp in China. 
First of ail , ppp has good prospects 111 the field of infrastructure in China. 
International business monitoring report notes that the fast -growing construction market 
which is known as the world's third largest market, is rapid ly growing at a rate of 9 to 10% . 
Moreover, the ppp mode was also adopted in the O lympics projects. Ali these have 
accumulated good practical experi ence for future ppp projects . At the same time , ppp has 
many benefits for the public sector in China's infras tructure, the private sector as weil as the 
third-party. Nevertheless , so far , many of the ppp projects implemented in China have 
turned out to be unsuccessful. It was estimated by the ppp expet1S in China that a main 
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reason for the failures of the se ppp projects rested on the underestimatioll of risk in the 
projects and a lack of experience in risk management in ppp projects. 
It is noted that there are several specifie ri sks in China ' s ppp projects in the area of 
infrastructure construction , mainly including: 
• Lack of financing options; 
• Soc ial welfare and political risks due to pOOl' contract making and uncontroll ab le 
pricing sett ing; 
• Long-term contracts which lead to the failure in risk transferring; 
• Overrun of time-consuming and high cost the procurement process; 
• Much more higher funding costs for private sector; 
• Losing of control power for public sector; 
• The probability of errors in the concession agreement due to the lack of in-depth 
knowledge in ppp field; 
• A lack of ex perienced and independent consultants in the legal, technical, financial, 
and operational processes of the project; 
• Operational , market and rescue risks. 
Secondly, the ppp mode can help to conserve the total cost of the proj ect throughout 
the proj ect ' s life cyc le. It is very important for the government to do more research and to 
be willingly to take risks. The fl exible project finance is beneficial for projects in ppp 
mode and the increase of the proj ect supervision is also essential. Moreover, a transparent 
and fair allocation of risks in the ppp project is the key factor. Meanwhile we must focus 
on the risks assoc iated with contractual and legal obligations to manage and mitigate the 
res idual risk. For mitigation of the potential risk for PPP, several recommendations were 
made as fo ll ows: 
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• To establ ish a reliable risk management framework, and to identify, understand, 
reduce and monitor risks in various stages of the ppp cycle; 
• To estab li sh the commercial viability of the project; 
• To negotiate with the preferred bidder in the tendering process; 
• To adjust to the appropriate methods of management during the construction period; 
• To enable service level agreements. 
However, sorne ppp proj ects which has been applied in China, such as Beijing Metro 
Line 4 project, Shenzhen Metro Line 4 project etc. have already accumulated sorne 
experience in the ppp field. In addition of learning the successful international ppp 
examples, to strengthen risk management and to establish a qualified consulting service is 
essential. Furthermore, because of the long life cycle of ppp proj ect, the assessment and 
management aga inst the entire life cycle of the project is also necessary. 
Last but not the least, it is important for China to build a ppp mode with Chinese 
specific characteri stics. Chinais infrastructure construction and deve lopment has its own 
characteristics, and China is in a specific period of development. Thus ail the specific 
Chinese characteristics should be taken into account in Chinais infrastructure development 
and investment. Based on the international experience of PPP, the sum up of China's own 
successful experience is also impoliant. Wang Hao, the general manager of Infrastructure 
Investment Company of Beijing, c laimed that the accurate posit ioning, quantitatively 
separating, the introduction of mechanisms , and the strengthening of the supervision in PPP 
projects , can improve the effi ciency, achieve a win-win situation, as weil as establi sh a new 
government-enterpri se relations mechani sm between the public and the private sectors . 
Meanwhile, different cultures, customs, background, legal environment, as weil as 
transitions in economic and soc ial environment in China, it is obligated to estab li sh a PPP 
mode with Chinese own characteristics . 
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2.4 Method of the research 
Our research aims to present a general and overall situation of the implementation 
and the appli cation of ppp mode in projects in China, espec iall y how the risks are managed 
and what the problems and obstacles in the risk management of ppp projects in China. 
Generall y speaking, this paper is based on a case study of a typical and presentable 
large-scale ppp project that have taken place in China - the national stadium construction 
project for 2008 O lympic Games in Beijing. In our case study, not onl y the quantitative 
research method wi ll be applied by developing a questionnaire, but also the qualitative 
method will be used by interviewing an expert of ppp projects in China as weil. 
Firstly, a general introduction of the project will be given in order to present the 
background and relevant information of the Bird Nest project. Secondly, a questionnaire 
yvhicb aims to explore al! the risk factors in the Bird l'Jest Project and 11o\v the risk factors 
are allocated in this project will be developed, using the two-round Delphi survey method 
which is very popular among ail methods of deve loping a research. And a detailed and 
profound analysis of the risk facto rs' identification and a llocation will be presented 
accordingly, as we il as several spec ifi c risk fac tors in this particular project. Thirdly, the 
transcript of the interview with the ex pert will be provided as per attached in the annex to 
give a better and more comprehensive understanding and describing of the Bird Nest 
project as we il as the PPPs in China. Plus the questionnaire and the result of the Delphi 
survey will also be provided in the annex. 
CHAPTER 3 
CASE STUDV - ppp Project of Bird Nest Stadium 
The exploratory research of my thesis is based on a case study of a well-known large-
scaled ppp project in China, the project of the national stadillm for the Olympic Games of 
year 2008 in Beijing. As a large amollnt of fllnds were invested and a team of elites with 
abllndant experience and knowledge of the management of variolls sorts of ppp projects 
had participated in the operation process, we can say that this project is a very typical and 
representative one among all ppp projects in China for so far. Consequently, throllgh a 
deep and detailed stlldy of the risk management of this proj ect, we can indicate the present 
situation of risk management of ppp projects in China. Meanwhile, this case study can help 
us find out the problems and shortages in the risk management of this kind of projects. 
In this chapter, l will firstly develop a questionnaire which aims to explore al! the risk 
factors in the Bird Nest Project and how the risk factors are al!ocated in this project. A 
detailed and profollnd analysis of the risk factors' identification and allocation will be 
presented. The questionnaire will be distributed among the projects managers of each phase 
of the whole project from both the public and private partners. Secondly, l will focus on the 
analysis of the application of risk management of this project through an interview with a 
professor in Beijing University, who had contribllted a lot in the research of ppp projects in 
China and had already pllblished a book with this subject in China, in order to give a more 
objective and comprehensive discussion for the object of my research. 
3.1 Projectlntroduction 
The National Stadi llm of China, dubbed as the "Bird Nest", which is located in the 
Olympic Green in the northeast of Beijing, is the main stadi1l111 for the 29
th 
Olympic 
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Games. This project was approved by Deijing Municipal Government early in 2003 , aiming 
to meet the obligations signed in the contract with the International Olympie Committee 
(IOC) as the Host City for the 29th Olympie Games in 2008. 
The Bird Nest Stadium covered a floor area of 258,000 square meters, will be able to 
accommodate a maximum of 91,000 :3pectators with a permanent capacity of 80,000 and a 
temporary of Il ,000. During the 2008 Olympics, the stadium will be used to host the 
opening and closing ceremonies, track and field competition events and football final. The 
aim of this project is to build an intemational-standard multi-functional stadium for the 29th 
Olympie Games - the biggest event for China in year 2008 , to show a bright new spot of 
infrastructure in Beijing to the whole world, and to make the stadium a remarkable legacy 
of China. 
The project is decided to be developed in the form of Public-Private-Patinership 
rooo\ ;,... \.1 .1 1.), lU 'vvhich Beijing Municipal Govermnent (BMG) undertakes 58% of the total 
investment as the public sector while the remaining 42% is financed by the private sector 
which is the China International Trust and investment Corporation (CITIC) consortium.( 
Sun, Fang, Wang, Dai, & Ly, 2008) 
Figure 1 Bird Nest Stadium 
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In this chapter, l will firstly develop a questionnaire which aims to explore ail the risk 
factors in the Bird Nest Project and how the risk factors are allocated in this project. A 
detai led and profound analysis of the risk factors' identification and allocation will be 
presented. The questionnaire will be distributed among the projects managers of each phase 
of the whole project from both the public and private partners. Secondly, l will focus on the 
analysis of the application of risk management of this project through an interview with a 
professor in Beijing University, who had contributed a lot in the research of ppp projects in 
China and had already published a book with this subject in China, in order to give a more 
objective and comprehensive discussion for the object of my research. 
3.1 Project Introduction 
The National Stadium of China, dubbed as the "Bird Nest", which is 10cated in the 
Olympic Green in the northeast of Beijing, is the main stadium for the 29
th 
Olympic 
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Games. Thi s project was approved by Beijing Municipal Gove rnment earl y in 2003, aiming 
to meet the obligations signed in the contract with the International Olympie Commi ttee 
(IOC) as the Host City for the 29lh Olympie Games in 2008. 
The Bird Nest Stadium covered a floor area of 258,000 square meters, will be able to 
accommodate a maximum of 91,000 spectators with a permanent capacity of 80,000 and a 
temporary of Il ,000. During the 2008 Olympics, the stadium wi ll be used to host the 
opening and closing ceremonies, track and field competition events and footbal l final. The 
aim of this project is to build an international-standard multi-functional stadium for the 29lh 
Olympie Games - the biggest event for China in year 2008, to show a bright new spot of 
infrastructure in Beijing to the whole world , and to make the stadium a remarkable legacy 
of China. 
The project is dec ided to be deve loped in the form of Public-Private-Partnership 
(PPP), in vvhich Beij ing ~l1unicipal Goverl1l11ent (B1\'1G) undertakes 58 0/0 of the total 
investment as the public secto r while the remaining 42% is financed by the private sector 
which is the China International Trust and investment Corporation (CITIC) consortium.( 
Sun, Fang, Wang, Dai, & Ly, 2008) 
Figure 1 Bird Nest Stad ium 
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3.1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUN D 
According to historical patterns, the Olympic Games have not only been a grand 
celebration of sports, but more importantly, the Olympic Games can bring tremendous 
public influence and numerous business activities to the host city and country. As for Asia, 
we aIl know that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and 1988 Seoul Olympics successfully 
propelled Japan and South Korea onto the global stage. Following their footsteps, the 
winning of the bid to host the Olympic Games is 2001 made the 2008 Beij ing Olympic 
Games a "coming out" party for China - an event that showcased China's maturation into a 
great economic and, to a lesser extent, political power. 
Since luly 13 , 2001 , the day when International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
announced that Beijing, the capital city of People 's Republic of China was elected as the 
host city for the 29th Olympic Oames in 2008, Chinese government and its masses of 
people have been weil aware of the broad publicity of this big event as weil as its great 
significance as a mark of China's emergence as a major global player to the world. On 
April 24 of 2002 , Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao noted that the Beijing Olympics present an 
opportunity for China, to show the world how "democratic, open, civilized, friendly. And 
harmonious" it is. 
After the winning of the bid of the ho st authority, Beijing's People's Municipal 
Government (BMG) decided to build the National Stadium as the main stadium for the 29th 
Olympics, which would be used for the opening and cIosing ceremonies, track and field 
events and the football final s . BOM has then, set three terms - "Green Olympics", "Hi-tech 
Olympics" and "Peopl e's Olympics" as the three main themes for 2008 Beijing Olympics 
Oames. It was claimed that the building of the main stadium for thi s Olympics should 
reflect the above three themes along with the concept of sustainable development. 
Furthermore, in order to make the stadium as a model of environment protection and 
present the world China's hi-tech achievements and innovative strength, advanced, 
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practical and world -class cut-edge technologies in the field of eco logy and environmenta l 
protections as we il as advanced, re liable and high-new technologies will be ado pted in the 
design, constructi on and utili zati on of the National Stadium througho ut and even afte r the 
Olym pics . Thi s project a ims to promote to the world a brand new image of a prospero us 
and civi li zed Beijing and the hi gh spirits of its citizens. Our goal is to make the stadium an 
everlastin g building meet various high functional req uirements within , at least, the next 50 
years. 
3.1.2 PROJ ECT DESC RIPTION 
The Municipal Government of Beijing (BMG) had drawn up a so-call ed "O lympic 
Action Plan" as soon as China won the host right. The PPP mode was decided to be 
adopted for the project, which means that all activities regarding the project, including the 
building, operating, maintaining, and financing will be accomplished thorough a 
co ll aboration of both the public and the private sectors. In the project, the Beijing State-
owned Assets Management Corporation authorized by the BMG as one of the shareholders 
undertakes 58% of the total investment whereas the crnc Consortium as the private sector 
fmances the remaining 42% . Afier 30 years which is called a pe ri od of concess ion, aIl 
responsibilities will be transferred to the govemment. 
3.1.2.1 BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF PROJECT 
Among the build of ail the sports facilities, the construction of the mam stadium, 
which was given a nick name as "Bird Nest" because of its bird 's nest looked-like shape, 
was the most important project of the Olympic infrastructure constructions. And thi s 
project, doubtless ly, becam,e the focu s of attentions from ail over the wo rld . At the very 
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beginning of its implementation, the project was required by BMG, to meet the demands as 
follows: 
1) As the project requested an investment with a total amount of 3 billion yuan, 
according to the government 's current financial statement, it was certain that 
funding support from some private departments was desperately needed to 
accomplish the project. 
2) The most advanced technologies should be used through the application of the 
project in order to guarantee the quality of the architecture and the speed of the 
proeess. 
3) Make sure that the stadium has its unique eharaeteristies and will beeome a 
landmark building of the city and the country. 
4) The future operation of the Bird Nest Stadium should not be over eommereialized. 
The priee of the entering tickets should be reasonable enough and be aeeepted by 
most of our eitizens. 
3.1.2.2 OVERALL FRAME OF PROJECT 
In view of the Bird Nest mall1 stadium project's background and its construction 
requirements, the project was decided to be developed in the form of Publie-Private-
Partnership (PPP) . The Beijing State-owned Assets Management Corporation authorized by 
the BMG as the public sector undertakes the main part of the total investment while the 
remaining is financed by the private sector which wi ll be assigned by the government 
through a tendering process. 
Through two rounds of biding in an international tendering process, a consortium 
consisted by three entities , which were China International Trust and Investment 
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Corporation (CITIC), Beijing Urban Constructi on Gro up Corporat ion (BUCGC), and 
Go lden State Ho lding Group Corporation (GSHGC), has eventually wo n the authority of 
the participation in the project. (S un, Fang, Wang, Dai, & Lv, 2008). Theil' sharing of 
responsibiliti es of the project is as follows: 
~ The public sector BMG invested 20.3 billion yuan, which undertakes 58% of the 
total inves tment; BMG won't assume any loss o r subsidies during the operation of 
the project; BMG calU10t obtain its in ves tment return until 30 years later, which is 
considered the coo peration period. 
~ The remaining 42% is financed by the private sector - the consortium made of 
CITIC, BUeGC and GSHGC. The consortium will, not only invest 14.7 billion in 
the project, but also undertake the construction, operation and maintenance of the 
project. [t can only get its investment return within the first 30 years. 
~ As soon as the cooperation period (3 0 years) is over, a il ri ghts of th e bird nest 
stadium will be return to the government. 
~ Ali standards of the project should be set and be confirmed by both the public and 
the pri vate secto rs. Every step of the project will be supervised by the publ ic sector. 
3.1.3 PROJECT OBJ ECTIVES 
As fo r the host city and country, the huge inflows of inves tment to suppoli the 
Olympics will bring us unpredictable economic and social benefits. T he spending on the 
Olympics will propel the govermnent 's ove rail income growth white the rec ruitment of 
partners, sponso rs and suppli ers for the project will help boost adverti s ing spending 
sharp ly. The proj ect will also bring a breakthrough in terms of economic development, 
urban construction, social civilization and the c iti zens' living quality. Furthermore, the 
number of Foreign tourists in Beijing will rise rapidly as a result of the increased vis ibility 
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that the Olympic architectures bring to the host country. The Olympic spirits' fast spread 
and extensively popularizing among Chinese people will enhance the reputation of both the 
city and the country. 
As for the project itself, besides its goal of meeting aIl demands of holding the 
Olympic Games, the main objective of the project is of course, to obtain the maximum 
profit. And this notion should be insisted during each phase of the project, for example, the 
design , construction, operation, financing, maintenance and transfer. During the Olympic 
period, the stadium will be used for various sorts of competitions. Weil organized games 
and exce llent services should be provided to every athletes and all spectators; after the 
Olympics, the stadium can still make profits by holding special competitions events such 
International Track and Field Championships, World Cup Football Games etc.), various 
regular sports games (such as National Football Matches, Asian Track and Field 
Competitions etc.), and different sorts of non-competitive events (such as art 
performances, conce11s, and commercial exhibitions etc.) 
3 .2 Pro j ect Structure 
The Project is developed in the form of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP), or more 
exactly Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) which is one of the different forms of PPP mode. 
Before presenting the companies and organizations that participated in the project and 
explain ing how the whole project is operated phase by phase, we will first give a brief 
introduction of what exactly the BOT model is. 
54 
3.2.1 D EFI NITION OF TI-l E MOD E OF PROJ ECT 
3.2.1.1 WHY USE THE ppp MODE? 
In the case of our project, a total of 250 billion yuan (Chinese Dollars) was planned to 
be invested for the construction of all the infrastructures regarding this Ol ympie events. 
The BMG was expected to undertake 180 billion of this entire investment among which an 
estimation of 20 billion was planned for the construction of all Olympie venues, including 
the Bird Nest stadium, the Water Cube, the Olympie Park and ail other 35 stadiums and 
venues . As a matter of fact, the amount of current income of BMG was about 40 billion 
yuan, of which the avail able funds for thi s proj ect were only over 12 billion. Under these 
circumstances, even a predicable annual increase of the BGM ' s income was taken into 
acco unt, there still ex isted a long way for our government to fill in the gap of the finance 
requirement needed by this huge-scaied project by itseif. Obviousiy, the government is 
fac ing with the problem of a lack of a certain amount of fund s. As a result, a new mode -
Public-Private-Partnership was brought in fo r the following reasons: 
• Considering the signifi cance and importance of Olympie Games, the revenues 
generated by the project is estimated to be able to coyer its cost and prov ide 
suffic ient return on investment. Therefore, the proj ect is financially viable fo r the 
private entiti es. 
• The viability of the project fo r the government depends on its efficiency in 
comparison with the economics of financing the project with public funds. The 
private sector is expected to bring qualifi ed expertise and high effic iency to the 
project. Thus, even if the government could borrow money on better conditions 
compared to that of the private sector, the above factors could offset thi s particular 
advantage . 
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• A substantial part of the risk of the project will be partly transferred to the private 
sector, including political risk, technical risk, financing risk etc . In this way, the 
burden on the government can be reduced. 
3.2.1.2 COMPARISON BETWEEN BOT AND ppp 
Although the term "PPP" is broadly used to describe a range of relationships among 
public and private entities in the context of infrastructure and other services, it is also a 
general name used to conclude a group of various types of PPP mode, for example, BOT 
(Build-Operate-Transfer), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), BOO (Build-Own-
Operate) etc. (ZHAO & WANG, 2007) In our case, the government has chosen the BOT 
form as the final mode for the project, which is a form that finds extensive application in 
the infrastructure projects and in public private partnerships. 
In addition of the related notion introduced in the previous literature review, l will 
make a further comparison these two terms BOT and PPP in the table as follows , to give a 
better research of the proj ect. 
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Tab le 4 : Comparison of BOT and ppp 
~on 
Characteri' 
Similari ties 
Diffe rences 
c 
(Il 
Cf) 
H o 
ëii 
c 
o 
ppp BOT 
1. invo lvement of participants including fi nancier, investor 
and guarantor 
Il. combine the pub lic and the pri vate sectors in a same way, 
by the signing of concess ion agreement 
Ill. the profi ts of the project is used in debt repayment and 
investment return 
IV. as sets belong to the proj ect are the mortgage fo r ail 
acti viti es and risks of the project 
Government and private 
Each participant has their own 
entity has common interest 
interest and the y ail alm to 
and they alm to achieve a 
max imize their own interes t. 
win-win situation. 
./ choos ing proj ect ./ confirming project 
partners 
./ tendering 
./ confirming project 
./ establishing proj ect 
./ establi shing project company 
company 
./ financi ng~constru ct i n g~ 
./ te ndering~financin g o pe rating~tran s fe rrin g 
~constructi ng~oper 
at ing~transfe rring 
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Flirthermore, l conc illde respectively the advantages and disadvantages of ppp and 
BOT as below: 
For PPP: 
o Advantages: 
- I-Ielp the government transfer part of the risks of project. 
- Improve the relationship between government and private enterprises 
by sharing some sort of common interests. 
- The participation of private entity can bring high-new technologies 
and management experience into the proj ect. 
- The collaboration between public and private sectors can accelerate 
the project progress , reducing extra cost for delay. 
o Disadvantages: 
- The government takes some risks ln choosing the proper private 
partners. 
- The complexity of the organizational form makes the management of 
project more difficult and requires a good coordination among 
different departments. 
- I-Iow to reasonably share the investment's financial return may cause 
sorne disputes. 
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For BOT: 
o Advantages: 
A li responsibili ties regarding the proj ect wi ll be transferred to private 
partners and a lot of ri sks that the government is supposed to take are 
avoided. 
The financial debt of the government is partl y reduced . 
The organizati onal structure is less complicated and the coordinati on 
between public and private sectors is easier. 
The share of project ' s profits is determined before starting the 
project and the disputes between public and private sectors will be 
much less. 
o Disadvantages : 
The pre-project process, including the understanding, negotiatio n and 
consulting between the public and private sectors may last too long 
to prolong the delay and to cause ex tra co st in the tendering process . 
The increas ing risk shared by the private sector gives more concerns 
to the private enterpri ses and makes it more difficult for the investo rs 
to make decisions. 
Sorne confli cts regarding the sharing of profi ts may be generated in 
the fin ancing process and slow down the speed of the project ' s 
development. 
In thi s BOT framework, the BMG which plays a role as a third party, delegates to the 
pri vate sector entiti es to des ign and build the stadium and to operate and main tain this sport 
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facility for 30 years, which is called the concession period. During this period , the CITIC 
consortium as the private party, has the responsibility to l'aise the finance for the project 
and is entitled to retain ail revenues generated by the project and is the owner of regarded 
facilities. At the end of the concession period, ail rights and responsibilities regarding the 
stadium will be transferred to BMG without any remuneration of the private entity 
involved. 
3.2.2 PARTNERS' PARTICIPATION AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES 
A project company is set up for the project, which comprises mainly of two parts: the 
public partners and the private partners. In addition, some projects management advisors 
are also recruited . We will then proceed to the introduction to each of the project's partners. 
According to the figure as below, ail the partners that had participated in the project 
are listed. And the figure also illustrates the project 's basic structure. We'll then continue to 
explain how the project is developed and the function of public sector and private partners 
in the process. 
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Note: BDPC- Beijing Development Planning Commission; CITIC- China International 
Trust and Investment Corporati on; BUCGC- Beijing Urban Construction Group 
Corporation; GSI-IGC- Golden State Holding Group Corporati on; BSAMC- Beijing 
State-owned Assets Management Corporat ion; BOCOG- Beijing Organi zing Committee 
fo r the Games of XXIX Olympiad ; BCEG- Beijing Construction Engineering Group; 
CSCEC- China State Construction Engineering Corporation 
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3.2.2.1 THE PUBLIC PARTNER: BSAMC 
3.2.2.1.a Company profile 
The Beijing State-owned Assets Management Corporation (BSAMC) is nominated , 
mainly by the BMG, as the representative of the public , contributing 58% of the total 
investment. The BSAMC is a large-sized State-owned investment company authorized by 
Beijing municipal government to especially engage in capital operations. Its predecessor 
was Beijing State-Owned Assets Operation Company, which was founded in 1992, merged 
with the former Beij ing Overseas Financing and Investment Management Center in April 
2001. The merged company was subsequently transformed by the Beijing municipal 
government into aState wholly-owned company in accordance with the modern enterprise 
system and entrusted to operate and manage important State-owned assets in Beijing. 
As of the end of 2010, BSAMC possessed RMB46.8 billion of total assets and 
RMB 13.3 billion of net assets. BSAMC as the implementer and operator of major projects 
in Beijing focuses its business operations in four major fields: financial services, hi-etch 
and modern manufacturing, culture and creativity, urban functionality area development, 
environmental protection and new energies. Ten years of tremendous work has given rise to 
a great company. ln its first 5 years, BSAMC consolidated its foundations, carried out 
reforms and adjustment, restructures itself from a utility unit into a modern enterprise, and 
changed from an asset management company purely undertaking government tasks to a 
large-sized State-owned investment holdings company with market functions. In its second 
five years, BSAMC achieved fast growth in both size and efficiency. The third five years, 
which coincide with China' s Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, will see BSAMC embarking 
on a new journey of frog-Ieap development. 
3.2.2.1.b Business Performance 
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Over the past 10 years, BSAM has ac hieved an impressive track reco rd of business 
perfo rmance: (Figure 3) 
Total assets: 
As of the end of 20 10, BSAM ' s assets total ed RMB46.8 billion, up by 8.6 times ove r 
RMB4.875 billion in 200 1. 
Net assets : 
As of the end of20 10, BSAM ' s net assets reached RMB1 3.3 billion, up by 1. 8 times 
over RMB4.72 1 in 200 1. 
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Figure 3 Business Performance of BSAM 
Total profi ts : 
BSAM increased its thin profi ts at the time of its fo unding to almost RMB l A bil lion 
in 20 10. 
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Figure 4 Total Profits of BSAM 
3 .2.2.I.c Responsibilities and Obligation in the project 
In this project, the government BMG, acting as the public part, has mainly two 
important obligations. 
Firstly, BMG is the original owner of ail rights concerning the project. In order to let 
the private parts in, certain rights have to be granted through a process of signing the 
Concession Agreement. During the concession period, private partners are authorized to 
invest, finance, design and construct the national stadium, and afterwards, to operate, 
maintain and repair the stadium. Ali activities should obey the tenus and conditions set in 
the Concession Agreement. 
Secondly, the building of su ch a large-scaled sport facility needs a certain area of 
land. Due to the present emergent situation of land acquisition in China, to obtain the use of 
such a piece of land was supposed to cost the project company a considerable sum of 
money. As to show government's supports and incentives to the project, the Land 
Administrative Authority of BMG gratuitously offers the Project Company the allocated 
land use rights of the project facilities site for free, that is so say, the Project Company is 
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not required to pay the land premlUm or supporting infrastructure construction fee , 
provided that the Project Company shall coyer the first level land development expenses 
(1,040 yuan per square meter). 
3.2.2 .2 The private partners: CITIC, BUCGC, GSHGC & Advisors (VCGP, BYB) 
As indicated in the figure as below, the private sector is a consortium composed by 
three companies - China International Trust and lnvestment Corporation (C ITIC), Beij ing 
Urban Construction Group Corporation (BUCEC) and Golden State Holding Group 
Cooperation (GSHGC), with equity proportion in the total investment of 65%, 30% and 5% 
respectively. Each of the three companies has good business performance and rich 
experience in large-scaled construction proj ects. 
Figure 5 Ratio of Private Partners Investment 
3.2.2.2.a.Company introduction 
.:. CITIC: 
o ClTIC 
~ BUCEC 
o GSHGC 
This company has a long and rich history as it was estab lished in 1979 by our former 
vice pres ident of People 's Republic of China and was approved and supported by Deng 
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Xiaoping, a very famous leader in China ' s liberation hi story. Along aI l these years, the 
company had been regarded as the widow of China 's opening to the outside world and as a 
pilot of China's economic reform . With the endeavor of almost 30 years, CITIC has now 
become a large trans-national conglomerate, which owns 44 subsidiaries over the world, 
including Hong Kong, the United States, Canada, Australia etc. Besides, the company has 
also a few representative offices in Tokyo, New York and Frankfurt. The core business of 
the company ranges from financial industry, industrial investment to service industries. 
Beijing Urban Construction Group Corporation (BUCGC) is a state-owned enterprise 
of China consisting of 120 corporate enterprises and over 20 overseas branches. It is one of 
the Top 500 Chinese Enterprises and one of the Top 225 International Enterprises. BUCGC 
has a total assets value of 5.3 billion U.S. dollars with over 28000 employees, and its 
annual turnover reaches 5.7 billion U.S. dollars . BUCGC is a comprehensive construction 
enterprise. Its business specializes in the management of construction project, real estate 
development, design & consulting, production and capital operation. BUCGC is 
speciali zing in the design and construction of industrial and civil works , municipal works, 
metro , expressway, deep foundation , airport and long distance pipeline works and the real 
estate development and capital operation. It also deals with the business such as industrial 
production, property management, hotel operation, foreign trade, etc. It is one of the Top 10 
Construction Enterprises in China. From the establishment of the group in the year of 1983 , 
BUCGC has become the leader of the construction market of China after 27 years' 
deve lopment. It has constructed many national and provincial key projects, foreign-
invested projects and many overseas projects in Asia, Europe, Africa and America. 
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.:. GSHGC: 
Formerl y known as Go lden Stute Import & Export Ltd., the company was establlshed 
in the United States in 1986 and entered Chinese market in 1988. As a project consultant in 
Chi na fo r over 50 in te rnati onal companies, GSHGC has active ly pro moted economic and 
technological cooperation between Chinese enterpri ses and their international coun terparts 
on environment protection and infrastructure by success ively participated in over 200 
goverrunental loan projects, including approx imately 100 water proj ects in China, majo r 
metropolitan transpoli ation and so lid wasted projects, vari ous wind power generati on 
projects, and equipment import projects for hospitals, institutes, radio broadcasting and TV 
stati ons, and factor ies . In the past 20 years, Go lden State has turned from a consultant for 
government loan projects to a group corporati on with over 1600 employees, nearl y 30 
speciali zed service companies, more than 10 plants on water supply, waste water treatment, 
and so lid waste treatment in China. Go lden State has successfull y applied the investment 
modes of BOT, PPP, and TOT on projects, and invested in constructi on or purchase of 4 
water plants, 6 waste water treatment plants, and 4 waste incineration plants . 
• :. Project Management Adv isors (VCGP & BYB) 
Vinci Constructi on Grand Projects (VCGP) and Bouygues Batiment (BYB) are the 
two project management adviso rs hired by the Project Company. VCGP is a member of the 
French Vinci Group of Companies, which is among the largest group fo r construction and 
assoc iated services in the world. lt has its own representative office in Beijing, which offers 
serv ices in civil and building constructions and relates services, fo r example, to ll roads, 
airports, car parking lots etc.; whil e BYB is a member of the Bouygues Gro up of 
Companies, which is also a French company. This company is large French conglomerate 
with abundant ex perience in ail sorts of projects in the fields of construction , serv lces, 
te lecomm and media. 
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3.2.2.2.b Duties and responsibilities in the Project 
First of ail , CITIC was elected by the private partners as the leader and representative 
of the private consortium, also names as CITTC Consortium. The company is in charge of 
the coordination of the bid preparation, as weil as of submitting jointly the bidding 
document and materi al with the other two companies - BUCGC and SGHGC. Meanwhile, 
CITIC is also appointed as the role of legal person of the Project 's Consortium, which 
represents ail the private partners; 
Secondly, BUCGC and GSHGC, both of which are large compames with ri ch 
experience in simil ar proj ects, will provide the best team of experts with specialized skills 
in various fi elds and professional person with abundant knowledge in management of 
proj ects. 
Last but not the least, the two advisors of the project will provide profess ional advises 
in the process of project management and project operation. As both of these two advisors, 
VCGP and BYB are al so sharcholdcrs of the consortium ofStadium of France, which is the 
first ppp proj ect in the fi eld of sports facilities, their advices will be persuas ive and useful. 
Furthermore, the experti se and know- how of VCGP and BYB in the design, financing, 
construction of a sport venue and that of management and operation of su ch a sport fac ility 
can bring value and competiti veness to the Project Company. 
3.3 Ri sk management ofProject 
In thi s part, we' ll proceed to a detail ed and profound analysis of the ri sk management 
fo r thi s specifie proj ect. We will develop our research in the ways as fo llows: 
Firstly, a il ri sk factors encountered in the studied project will be li sted and sorted 
through a literature rev iew and a telephone interview with Professor Wang who already had 
co ll ect useful data regarding this proj ect. 
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Secondl y, a two-round De lphi Survey will be applied to rank the ri sk fac tors and to 
show how each risk fac tor is allocated between the private and public sec tors by analyzing 
the results of questionnaire . 
Last but not the least, compared w ith the prev ious research of the ri sk management of 
p pp projects in China, we will give a further description of several new risk fac tors which 
have ne ver appeared in the former ppp projects in China and make a profound exp lanation 
of the difference in the ri sks of thi s case with the ri sks encountered by the othe r ppp 
projects in China. 
3.3.1 RISK IOENTI FICATIO 
Accord ing to a large amount of literature review and prev ious research results of 
te lephone interviews (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2010) for the data collecting carried out by 
Professor Wang, who is an expert in China's ppp research, with the help of his co lleagues , 
4 1 risk fac tors regarding the Bird Nest Stadium Project were identifi ed, as shown in Table 
5, which include: ( 1) the principle risks fo r the pas t ppp projects in China; (2) the ri sk 
facto rs approved by ex pelis and respondents with hands-on working ex perience in the Bird 
Nest ppp project in China; (3) ri sks that have been li sted out and been studi ed in p pp 
projects in fo reign countries that have similarities with our case . In addition, the defi niti on 
of each ri sk fac tor was also give n as shown in Table 6, which would be later attached to the 
questionnaire distr ibuted to the people who participated in the management of the B ird Nest 
Project. 
Based on a fo rm of catego ri zati on of projects ri sks deve loped by Li (B ing, Akintoye, 
Edwards, & Hardcastl e, 2005), we class ify ail the risk factors into three leve ls: macro leve l; 
meso level; and micro level. Li also defined each of the three leve ls ri sks as fo llows: 
.:. The macro level risks mainly comprise the risks resulted from reasons ex ternal to 
the project itse lf, for example, po litical and legal conditi ons, economic cond itions, 
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social conditions and natural environment conditions etc . In another word, these 
risks arise From the events outside the project itself, but can, to a certain extent, 
have influence on the project itself and the outcomes of the project. 
.:. The micro level risks represents the risks arise From within the project itself, 
including the project's implementation, construction, operation, as weIl as the 
involving issues such as design problems, choose of location, market demand , 
project's products' usage etc . 
• :. The micro level risks are the risks generated From the conflicts in the relationship 
between the private sector and the public sector, or among the partners in the private 
sector itself, due to the inherent differences in contract management. The key reason 
of thi s level risks it the fact that the public sector puts its emphasis on social 
responsibility, whereas the private sector is mainly profit driven. 
The three levels of risks are ail li sted separately in the tables as below. For each level 
of risks, several groups are divided according to their different natures. For example, risks 
belonged to the macro level are divided into 5 groups according to different natures of the 
risk itself, su ch as political, legal, macro-economic, social and natural , while meso level 
risks are also classified by 5 different groups in the light of different phases along the entire 
process of the project, including the preparation and start-up, construction, operation, and 
supervision, plus the risks arise in the project finance problems. Besides, two groups, 
named as public-private relationship and third party, are set up for the micro level risks. 
Detailed catalogues for risks of each leve l are listed in the tables as below, while the 
definitions of every risk factor are given in table X followed by the risk list in order to help 
the readers and the respondents of the later questionnaire survey have a better 
understanding of what each risk means exactly and also to ensure the respondents have the 
same understanding of these risks. 
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Table 5 : Three Level Risks 
• Macro Level Risks: 
,.- " ._ '. 
Group Risk Category RF Risk Factor (RF) 
ID 
ID Factor Group 
-, -, _ .. - -- - .-
FI Govenunent's Intervention 
F2 Expropriation and Nationalization 
F3 Government's Reliability 
G Political 
F4 Corruption 
F5 Political Opposition 
F6 Poor Political Decision Making 
F7 Immature J uristic System 
F8 Change in Law 
2 G Legal 
F9 Change in Tax Regulati on 
FlO Tarif Change 
FIl Interest Rate 
Macro 
3 G FI2 Foreign Exchange and Convertibility 
economlC 
FI3 Inflation 
F14 Public Opposition 
4 G Social 
F 15 Market Demand Change 
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-
F 16 Geotechnical Conditions 
5 G Natural F17 Force Majeure 
F 18 Environmental Protection 
• Meso Level Risks: 
Group Risk Category RF Risk Factor (RF) 
ID 
ID Factor Group 
F19 
Land Acquisition 
Competition for Exclusive 
Preparation and F20 
6 G Right 
Star-up F21 
Uncompetitive Tender 
F22 
Subjective Evaluation 
F23 
Construction Changes 
Contracts with Excessive 
F24 
Variation 
7 G Construction F25 
Construction Cost Overrun 
F26 
Construction Delay 
F27 
Design Risk 
F28 Supporting Utilities Risk 
8 G Operation 
F29 Technology Risk 
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F30 Operation Changes 
F31 Operation Co st Overrun 
F32 Consortium Inability 
9 G Supervision 
F33 Maintenance Risk 
F34 Financial Risk 
10 G Project Finance F35 Payment Risk 
F36 Insufficient Financial Audit 
• Micro Leve! Risks: 
-- ~.- -- - ~_._ ... -... ------- - ---,~._.- ._---- - .- --
Group Risk Category RF ID Risk Factor (RF) 
ID Factor Group 
--
Public F37 
Organization/Coordination 
Risk 
SectoriPrivate 
Il G F38 
Sector Inadequacy of Know!edge 
Relationship F39 
Private Investor Change 
F40 Third Party Reliability 
12 G Third Party 
F41 Staff Cri ses 
.. - - .-
D 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table 6 : Definition of Risks 
Risk Factor 
Government ' s 
Intervention 
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Definition 
Public sector interferes umeasonably In 
privatized facilities/services. 
Expropriation 
Nationalization 
and Due to political, social or economic pressures, 
Government's 
Reliability 
Corruption 
Political Opposition 
Poor Political 
Decision Making 
Immature 
System 
Juristic 
Change in Law 
local government takes over the facility run by 
private firm without glvmg reasonable 
compensation. 
The reliability and creditworthiness of the 
government to be able and willing to honor their 
obligations in future. 
Corrupt local government official demand 
bribes or unjust rewards. 
Delay or refusaI of project approval and permit 
by local government. 
Government officiaIs considers more their 
career achievement or short-term goals or personal 
interests, or with little PPP experience etc., resulting 
in a poor political decision-making process. 
The lack of national PPP law leads to different 
ways of PPP implementation in different places in 
China. 
Local government's inconsistent application of 
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8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
new regul ati ons and laws. 
Change 
Regulation 
Tax Central or local govenU11ent's inconsistent 
Tariff Change 
Interest Rate 
Fore ign Exchange 
and Convertibility 
Inflation 
Public Opposition 
applicati on of tax regulation. 
Improper tariff design or inflex ible adj ustment 
framework leading to the insuffic ient income. 
Unanticipated local interest rate due to 
immature local economic and banking systems. 
Fluctuation in currency exchange rate and/ or 
difficulty of convertibility. 
Unanticipated local inflation rate due to 
immature local economic and banking systems. 
Prej udice from public due to different local 
living standards, values, culture, social system, etc . 
Market 
Change 
Demand Demand change from fac tors as social, 
Geotechnical 
Conditions and Weather 
Force Majeure 
Env ironmental 
Protection 
economic, enviromnent, etc. 
Poor 
conditions. 
or unexpected gro und/weather 
The circumstances that are out of the control of 
both foreign and local partners, such as flood , fixes , 
storms, epidemic diseases, war hostilities and 
embargo. 
Stringent regul ation whi ch w ill have an impact 
on construction fi rms ' poor attenti on to 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Land Acquisition 
Competition 
exclusive-right 
U ncompetitive 
Tender 
Subjective 
Evaluation 
Construction 
Changes 
Contracts 
Excessive Variation 
Construction 
Overrun 
for 
with 
Cost 
Construction Delay 
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environmental issues. 
The project land is unavai lable, or unable to be 
occupied at the required time. 
The government does not offer the exc lusive 
right, or do es not honor to its commitment and build 
another competitive project. 
The tendering process and documents vary 
from project to project and from province to 
prov1l1ce 111 China without transparent or 
standardized models. 
Subjective evaluation and design of the 
concession period, tariff structure, market demand, 
etc. 
Unanticipated changes and errors in the 
construction resulting from the improper design. 
Improper arrangements 
including inappropriate ri sk 
stakeholders, commitment 
partners. 
111 the con tracts 
allocation among 
from public/private 
Construction cost more than predicted or poor 
construction quality . 
Longer construction time than predicted or 
Subcontractors and suppliers not being able to 
supply labor or material on time. 
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27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Design Risk 
Supporting Utilities 
Risk 
Technology Risk 
Operation Changes 
Delay in project approvals and permits due to 
design deficiency. 
Supporting utilities, such as electricity, water, 
necessary for the construction, operation and 
management would not be available in a timely 
manJ1er or at fair rates. 
The techl1010gy adopted not being mature or 
able to meet the requirements. 
Unanticipated changes and errors 111 the 
operation resulting from poor investigation. 
Operation 
OvelTun 
Cost Operation cost overrun resulting from 
improper measurement, iU planned schedule or low 
operation efficiency. 
Consortium Inability The consortium not being able to perfo rm its 
32 obligations as a ppp proj ect company. 
33 
34 
Maintenance Risk 
Financial Risk 
Maintenance costs higher than expected or 
more frequent than expected. 
POOl' financial market or unavailab ility or 
financial instrument resul ti ng di ffic ul ty of financing. 
Payment Risk The consumer/government not being able or 
35 willing to pay, due to soci al or other reasons. 
Insuffic ient Financial The government or lenders would IlOt perform 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Audit 
Organization 
Coordination Risk 
Inadequacy 
Knowledge 
Private 
Change 
Third 
Reliability 
Staff Crises 
and 
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a careful audit to the financial status of the project 
company. 
An increase of transaction cost or a dispute 
may occur because of the improper organization and 
coordination between private and public sectors. 
of Inadequate expenence 111 PPP/ Inadequate 
distribution of responsibilities and authority 111 
partnership. 
Investor The govemment or lenders would not perfoml 
Party 
a careful audit to the financial status of the project 
company. 
The reliabi lity and creditworthiness of a third 
party to be able and willing to honor their 
ob li gations in future. 
Conflicts or discordance among staff 111 or 
between departments. 
3.3.2 RISK ALLOCATION 
3.3.2.1 Two-round Delphi Survey 
The appropriate allocation of risks between the public and private sectors is a key 
requirement for the achievement of value for money in PPP projects. (Shen, Platten, & 
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Deng, 2006) To which sector the ri sk fac tors should be allocated depends on the type of the 
ri sk and the ability of wh ich sector could better control and manage the risk . ln the study of 
risk a ll ocation for the Bird Nest Project, a two-round Delphi survey research method will 
be adopted. From November 201 1 to January 20 12, a Delphi questionnaire regarding the 
risk factors ' allocation and ranking of the Beijing Bird Nest Stadium Project was 
distributed to 22 practitioners/academics who had participated in the management of the 
project. 
As the questionnaire is against this particular case, al! respondents chosen are the 
ones who had taken place in the crucial decision-making and the management of different 
part of the proj ect, coming From both public and private sectors, (Ali their contacts 
provided by Professor Wang). Among ail the 22 chosen respondents, 10 people are From 
public sector BSAMC, 10 From pri vate sector comprised by three companies CITI C, 
BUCEC and GSHGC, with 2 others From two design companies VCGP and BYB as proj ect 
adviso rs. Besides, as they had play impoliant roles in such a big scaled ppp project with a 
worldwide significance, all of them are selected From the elite with in-depth knowledge and 
sound experience of domestic or international projects' management. According to their 
working background, each of the respondents can sati sfy the following criteria (De Jong, 
Mu, Stead, Ma, & Xi , 2010) , which makes their answers and opinions persuasive and 
believable: 
1) Having extensive wo rking ex perience in ppp projects in China. 
2) Having currentlrecent and direct involvement in risk management of PPP projects in 
China. 
3) Having a sound knowledge and understating of the concepts of ppp risks. 
The related information of chosen respondents is given in Table 7 as below: 
Table 7 : Information of Respondents 
Item Category 
Government 
State-owned 
Types of organization enterprises 
Private 
compames 
Less than 50 
million A verage turnover (per 
year) of the company the y 
working for 
(RMB dollars) 
Years of working 
expenences in management 
of project 
Numbers of 
participated ppp projects 
50 million - 1 
billion 
More th an 
billion 
Less than 5 years 
5-10 years 
More than la 
years 
Less than 4 
4-8 projects 
More than 8 
projects 
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Freq. % 
2 11.11% 
5 27.78% 
Il 61.11% 
o 0% 
2 11.11 % 
16 88.89% 
o 0% 
3 16.67% 
15 83 .33% 
3 16.67% 
1 l 6l.11% 
4 22.22% 
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In the fi rst ro und of the Delphi survey, a questionnaire which includes a lis t of a il 4 1 
risk facto rs as in Tab le 6, the de fini tion of each risk fac tor as in Tab le 6, aiong with an 
invitation lette r attached, were sent to the selected experts by emai!. The purpose of the 
invitation letter, as attached in the annex, was to explain the purpose of the research and ail 
respondents were info rmed that there would be two rounds of questionnaire. In the first 
round, the respondents were required to gi ve two scores to each risk fac tor: 
The fi rst score is to determine the allocation of the listed 41 ri sk factors, to either 
private or the public sector according to a fi ve-point Likert scale . Each score, with a range 
fro m 1 to 5, is defined as below: 
• " 1" - Government takes so le responsibility; 
• "2" - Gove rnment takes the majority responsibility; 
• "3" - Both publi c and private sectoïs share equal respons ibil ity; 
• "4" - Pri vate sector takes the majority responsibility; 
• "5" - Pri vate sector takes sole responsibility. 
The second sco re is to descri be the degree of each ri sk' s influence on the Bird Nest 
Project, in orde r to rank ail the ri sk fac tors according to their importance in thi s project, so 
that we could know which risk should be paid more attention to in such kind of ppp 
project. The eva luation of a fi ve-point Likert scale is al so used. The defi niti on of score 
ranged from 1 to 5 is as below: 
• " 1" - super low 
• "2" - low 
• "3" - med ium 
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• "4" - high 
• "5" - very high 
In the first round Delphi questionnaire, the respondents were not only asked to score 
the 41 risk factors already listed , but also to advise if there existed new and specifie risk 
factors as for this particular national stadium building project. As a result, a total of 18 
completed questionnaires were returned in the first round Delphi survey, representing a 
respond rate of 81.82%. Among the 18 returned questionnaires, 7 from public sector, 9 
from private sector (separately 4 from CITIC, 3 from BUCEC, and 2 from GSHGC), and 
the rest 2 from design advisors. Furthermore, three new risk factors were suggested by the 
respondents , which were "Competitions with existing stadiums", "Dispute among the 
private partners themselves", and "Change or Termination of Concession". These three 
risks were numbered accordingly as F42 Competitions with existing stadiums, F43 Dispute 
among the private partners themselves, F44 Change or Termination of Concession, and 
added to the original 41 risk list. Therefore, the revised Ri sk Factor List with a total of 44 
risks was offered to the respondents in the second round survey. Furthermore, respondents 
were also provided with feedback of the results obtained in the first round. The averages of 
the scores of each risk factor , the frequency of each option in the five-poin t scale, as weil as 
the respondent ' s own score in the first round were shown. In the second round , ail 
respondents were requested to re-assess their scores in the li ght of the provided first-round 
results , and to give score to the three new added risk factors. A total of 17 completed 
questionnaires were sent back in the second round , which represent a highly successive rate 
of 100%. The mean score of each risk was ca\culated to determine their allocation between 
public and private sectors and to rank the risks . We will then continue to analyze the results 
of risk al location according the survey results . As the risk ranking airns to reveal the 
severe st risks in this project, the risk factor with the highest mean score regarding the risk 
ranking will be Ii sted and explained in chapter 4, where sorne specifie ri sks that the Bird 
Nest Project had encountered will be well discussed. 
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Acco rding to the "half-adjusting" principle (Yongj ian Ke and A lbert Chan, 2009), 
which was also adopted by Professor Wang in hi s research of "Preferred ri sk all ocation in 
China's ppp Project" in 2009, the preferred ri sk allocation options are presented as mean 
values calcu lated from results given by all respondents in the way as be low: 
a) Ri sk with "Mean score of RF < 1.5" is to be solely allocated to the public sector. 
b) Risk with " l.5::; Mean score of RF <2.5" is to be mostl y a llocated to the public 
sector. 
c) Ri sk with "2. 5::; Mean score of RF <3.5" is to be equally shared by both the pu bli c 
and private sectors. 
d) Risk with "3.5::; Mean score of RF <4.5 " is to be mostl y allocated to the private 
sector. 
e) Risk with "Mean score ofRF2:4.5" is to be solely allocated to the private sector. 
3.3.2.2 Results Analys is 
In the fo llowing analysis of the risk allocation of the studied case, we wi ll fi rst ly, in 
Part 1, discuss how the identified 12 groups of risks are allocated acco rding to the different 
group they have been categorized (as for the new added three risk factors which was added 
in the second round of Delphi survey, we will di scuss them later in the next chapter called 
the discuss ion aro und the case study, as they are very special and specifie ones in this PPP 
project); then in Part 2, we will proceed to make a summary of ail the ri sk factors by 
dividing them into 5 categories as follows: i.) Risks to be so lely allocated to the public 
sector ; ii. ) Risks to be mostly allocated to the public sector ; iii .) Ri sks to be equall y 
shared by the public and private sectors ; iv. ) Ri sks to be mostl y allocated to the pri vate 
sector ; v.) Risks to be so lely allocated to the private sector. A nd possible ways of ri sk 
mi tigat ion wi ll be suggested and advi sed accordingly. 
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.i- Part 1: 
The appropriate a ll ocati on of ri sks between the public and private sectors is a key 
requi rement fo r the achievement of value for money in ppp projects. (Li-Yin Shen, 2006) 
W hether the risks should be allocated to the public sector or the private sector depends on 
the type of risk and the ability of either sector could contro l and manage them. The general 
principle in ppp ri sk a llocati on is that each individual ri sk is identi fied and then allocated to 
the party that is best to be abl e to manage the ri sk . Thi s principle has been adopted in the 
management of ri sk in implementing the Bird Nest Proj ect in China. The identifi ed risks by 
group are allocated as fo llows and a summary of the allocati on is presented in Tab le 8. The 
principle of prefe rred risk allocation by group is based on the level of maj ori ty opin ion 
(>50%). If over half of the ri sks in a single group are allocated to the publi c sector 
according to the respondents' results, we will consider this group of risks as allocated to the 
public sector. 
• G 1 & G2: These two groups of ri sks regarding the po li tical and legal aspects 
are obviously c10sely rel ated to the government and government officers and 
their decisions or actions . For example, a hi gh tariff fo r the users, huge profits 
for the investors or a wrong decision by the government on the project may 
resul t in great political and social pressures, for which the private partners can 
hard ly do anything to deal with these consequences under su ch circumstances 
(S houq iprn Wang, 2009) . Among these ri sks, risks as "Change in Law", 
"Immature j uri stic system" are considered as ri sks at a country level relevant to 
the legal system in China. If any change happens to the present law or j uri st ic 
system, it may cause serious consequences which, for example, may prevent the 
project company fro m fulfilling its obligations due to some add itional costs or 
inabi li ty to suppl y serv ice. For another, risks as "Government's intervention", 
"Government's reliability", "Poor politi cal decision-mak ing" and "Corrupt ion" 
are also at a country level but mostly re lated to some specific government 
officers. In thi s ppp project case, some high officers in the local government 
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BMG may make some wrong decisions , for instance, providing too much 
guarantees to investors or lacking accurate predictions of demand for the 
projects, which may lead to high cost in the contract-making process or incur 
complaints from the publics . Ail these risks may result from some limited 
experience and knowledge in ppp or some short-term goals for personal interest 
in the public sector. In summary, the public sector are mostly responsible for ail 
risks regarding the po litics and laws, especially for PPPs in China, where 
government is most powerful for the making of policies and regulations for 
which the private partners can hardly do anything to make a change. 
• G3: As for group 3 which includes risks at a market level, such as " Inflation" 
and "Foreign exchange and convertibility", both public and private parties 
preferable share that equall y, since either of the public sector or private 
investors can handle it we il alone. 
• G4: This group is mainly comprised of two risks , the public opposition and the 
change of market demand. The market demand is related to the market 
conditions concernmg social factors such as the provision of facilities , 
population from labor market, and demanded technologies etc. which are 
comparatively dynamic, and their changes can significantly affect the profits 
return of the stadi um that can be later collected for the private investors after the 
2008 Olympics; whereas the public opposition may occur due to reasons mostly 
regarding the gove rnment policies, changes of taxation, environ mental effects 
etc. , which would de pend more on the government ' s decision. ln concl usion, the 
private sector and the public sector share the risks in this gro up . 
• G5: The natural risks that may be encountered during the project include factors 
such as underground conditions, weather conditions, environmental protection 
and force majeure. Although these risks are generall y recognized as being 
severe, they have a low probability of occurrence. And according to their nature , 
either public secto r or private sector may not be able to deal with them alone 
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once such risks occur, for example, a rainstorm or an earthquake. Besides, the 
risk of the pollution to the land and surrounding, which associates with the 
operation and the overall planning of the project, is also shared between the 
government and the private partners. In conclusion, although the private partner 
is in better position to undertake site survey particularly on the underground 
conditions, such as any existing pi les, the earth conditions , etc., this group of 
natural risks should be almost equally shared between both the public sector and 
the private sector. 
• G6: The preparation of the project includes mainly two processes - the 
tendering process and the land acquisition. On the one hand, the tendering 
process of many ppp projects in China and the documents vary from project to 
project and from province to province without transparent or standardized 
models (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). This makes it most related to the local 
rules and regulations as well as the legal affairs. Besides, the government has to 
assume the risk of choosing inexperienced and unqualified private investors 
who may not be suitab le or competent for the projects, or even has financial 
difficulties. On the other hand, Beijing Municipal Government has the 
responsibility to take measures for ensuring the acquisition of an appropriate site 
for the Bird Nest National Stadium and for protecting the site from visual 
intrusion and incompatible land uses in surrounding areas . In this group of risks, 
the private partner is only responsible for the protection or demolition of 
existing buildings or facilities on the land. Thus, the public sector is mostly 
responsible for this group of risks. 
• G7 & 08 : These two groups of risks, which may occur during the construction 
and operation processes of the project, will mainly rest on the shoulders of the 
private pal1ners, including the technology risks, cost overrun, time delay, 
construction/operation changes, etc. The private partner is responsible for the 
completion and construction of land reclamation with associated infrastructure 
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and fac il it ies. And in the deve lopment of the project, there may be ri sks 
concern ing the loss in the construction and operat ions stages, for example, cost 
overrun made by the waste of resources or time delay because of poor quali ty 
perfo rmance. The private partners are mostl y responsible fo r such kind of ri sks. 
• 09: The risks of thi s gro up may occur in the supervision process of the project. 
The risks in the maintenance are normally borne by the business that is 
responsible for the day to day maintenance and operation of the project, which 
will affect the profi tabili ty of running the proj ects. Therefore, the maintenance 
risks should be a ll ocated mostly to the private patiners as it is for the operati on 
ri sks. Bes ides, the consortium inability is a lso suggested to be taken by the 
private sector as it is relati ve to the project consortium which is compri sed of 
private investors. Thus, thi s group of risks is allocated mostl y to the private 
sector. 
• G 10: This group of risks mainly concerns the project 's fi nancial problems. The 
implementati on of the Bird Nest Stadium involves huge amount of fi nancial 
reso urces contributed by both the private partners and the Beijing Municipal 
People's Government. The project is fi nanced by a mixture of debt and equ ity 
where the non-equity financ ing of the project is mainly loan t'rom banks. There 
are a lot of uncertainti es about the returns from these fi nanc ial commi tments due 
to the possible reasons such as changes in interest rates, exchange rates , 
ownership and other fac tors. Both the private partners and the government wi ll 
take the responsibility and the ri sk as the borrower of loan. It is agreed that thi s 
group of risks are shared between the two sectors. 
• 0 Il & G 12 : Both of the two groups include the ri sks belong to the M icro risks 
which mainl y refe r to the risks that may happen with sectors or among 
individuals. The public-pri vate re lationship risks may occur due to reasons such 
as inappro priate co-ordination or organization between parties, inadeq ua te 
worki ng experi ence or required knowledge. As in our case, the proj ect company 
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IS consisted of three large private enterprises with different culture and 
specialties. The relation among them would be much more complicated and 
more difficult to manage. Thus, there may be more probabilities of the 
occurrence of such ri sks for the private sector. And it is their responsibility to 
so lve the problem and achieve an agreement. The other group "Third party 
reliability" risk would normally occur at the construction or operation stage of a 
ppp project, which is regarded as being out of the control of both parties, after 
the government and the project company reach an agreement on risk allocation 
and define them in the concession contract (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). As 
most of the risks during the construction and operation stages of the project, the 
private sector will also take most of the responsibilities of these risks. 
Table 8 : Allocation of Risks in Group 
Gr 
Group Name Public Sector Private Sector 
oup ID 
Gl Political Mostly Responsible 
G2 Legal Mostly Responsible 
Macro-
G3 Macro economical Equally Shared Equall y Shared 
leve l 
G4 Social Equally Shared Equally Shared 
G5 Natural Equally Shared Equally Shared 
Preparation and 
Meso- G6 Mostly Responsible Star-up 
leve l 
G7 Construction Mostly Responsib le 
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G8 Operati on Mostly Responsible 
G9 Supervision Mostl y Responsi ble 
G l 0 Project Finance Equall y Shared Eq uall y Shared 
Public Sector -
M icro- G ll Private Sector Mos tl y Res ponsible 
level Relationship 
G l2 Third Party Mostly Res ponsible 
~ Palt 2: 
In this part, we will make a conclusion by sorting out a1l the risks accord ing to the ir 
allocated categori es. Meanwhile, a few ad vices and suggestions will be given in order to 
avo id the occurrence of ri sks and to reduce their influence or damage that may be caused to 
the project if the risks ex isted during the project. 
1. Risks to be solely allocated to the public secto r 
Accordin g to the result of the questi onnaire, the only ri sk facto r whi ch obtained a 
score less than 1.5 is the risk F2 "Expropriation and Nationalizati on". This resul t is turned 
out to be the same as in the research done by Yongj ian Ke and ShouQing Wang (2009), 
wh ich was a study of preferred risk allocation in the general ppp projects in China. As it is 
known to aIl that China is a developing socialism country. Gove rnment has the po li tical 
power and respons ibility to guarantee the max imized benefits of peop le and make sure the 
balanced deve lopment of the society. Therefo re, if any high tari ff fo r the consumers, hu ge 
profi ts fo r the in ves tors, or a wrong decision by the government on thi s nat iona l stadiu m 
PPP project result in great po litical or soc ial pressures, our government wo ul d be fo rced to 
terminate the concession and take over the fac ility run by the private project company 
without giving reasonable compensation (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 20 10). Under this 
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situation, the private partners can do nothing to deal with the loss and the consequences 
caused by the government's reactions. It is thus recommended that the concession 
agreement should provide for warranties, indemnities, liabilities and a compensation 
mechanism for early termination of contract (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). But as for 
our case, there is little chance that this risk may occur by taking into account the great 
significance and worldwide impact that the 2008 Olympics bring. And that is also a reason 
why this project attracted a large amount of private investors and competitors in the 
tendering process. And in this project, the expropriation risk is treated as political force 
majeure , which has already been mitigated . 
11. Risks to be mostly allocated to the public sector 
There are thirteen risks to be mostly allocated to the public sector, including 
FI "Government's Intervention", F3"Government's Reliability", F4"Corruption", 
F5"Political Opposition", f6"Poor Political Decision Making", F7"Immature Juristic 
System", F8"Change in Law", F9"Change in Tax Regulation", FlO"Tariff Change", 
F19"Land Acquisition", F20"Competition for Exclusive Right", F21 "Uncompetitive 
Tender" , and F22"Subj ective Evaluation". It is obvious that ail the se risks have shared a 
common characteristic, which is they are ail closely related to the country's policies and the 
governrnent's legal systems or sorne relevant government ' s officers and their behaviors 
(Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). Up until now, except for some local governments' or 
ministries' regulations relevant to PPP, for example, the Beijing and Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Developrnent's (formerly named Ministry of Construction) regulations, 
there are no national PPP laws in China (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). In order to 
decrease the probabi lity of these risks, it is very important and necessary for private 
investors, especially the foreign ones who have little recognition of Chinese rules and 
regulations, to study the local laws and adapt to China's typical politics. It is suggested by 
professor Wang that , for those how are planning to set steps in the PPP projects in China, 
the hiring of a professionallegal consultant is highly essential for handling the legal affairs. 
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Furthermore, some special rules could be set in the concession agreement to coyer such 
ri sks, for exampl e, " the change in law provision applies to any change in law after Bid 
Submiss ion Date" (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). The special regulat ions set fo r the Bird 
Nest Project will be presented in the next discussion chapter. 
For the risks related to the government officers as weil as their decisions, the private 
investors need to assess the liab ility of the government officiais ' dec isions, especially their 
verbal promises, for the reason that " the wrong decisions made by the local governments 
wou ld incur public complaints or even result in the key officiais' stepping down (Ke, 
Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010) . Another ri sk needs to be explained is the "Corruption". In 
order to gain the government 's cooperation and ass istance as much as they can, the private 
investors may spend not only a lot of time but also a large amount of money on some key 
officer which may lead to scandais as corruption. This will not onl y cause bas soc ial and 
public influences and also a delay on the efficiency of the operation of the project. In the 
Bird Nest Project, the risk corruption is addressed in the contract between the government 
and the project company in the fo rm of warranties . However, as corruptions never take 
place out in the open, it is difficult to be precluded or be reall y legislated . The Bird Nest 
project has gained a lot of government' s support and incenti ves. Therefore, the private 
parties still bears a certain part of the corrupti on ri sk. 
The other three risk fac tors of which the public sector should be most ly responsible 
are the risks regarding the tendering process . As it is mentioned before, the tendering 
documents depend largely on local laws and regulations so that the government's policies 
are we il worthy to be taken into account by the pri vate partners. 
Ill. Risks to be equall y shared by the public and private secto rs 
According to the survey results, there are twe lve risk factors to be equall y shared by 
both the public and pri vate parties. They are Fil " Interest Rate", F 12"Foreign Exchange 
and Convertibility", F 13" lnt1ation", F 14" Public Opposition", F 15"Market Oemand 
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Change", F 16"Geotechnical Conditions and Weather", F 17"Force Majeure", 
F 18" Environmental Protection", F22"S ubj ecti ve Eval uation", F34 "Financial Risk", 
F35"Payment Risk", F36"Insufficient Financial Audit". Ali the above risks sharing a same 
nature which makes them to be equally shared between the two sectors; that is neither the 
public sector nor the private sector would be able to deal with the risk on its own. 
For the risks regarding the nature disasters, an appropriate extension of the 
construction period or the concession period is suggested as a way of compensation. In the 
Bird Nest Project, comfort is derived from the comprehensive and well-structured Force 
Majeure provisions in the project contract, as weil as the appropriate msurance pro gram 
which ensure the benefits 0 the sponsors and lenders. 
For other risks relevant to the interest rates and the economical market, they may be 
dealt with directly through guaranteeing minimum purchase of project output, or indirectly 
through adjusting tariff with demand , or a combination of them (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 
2010). In the Bird Nest Project, as the project company is made not only the nation-owned 
enterprise, but also international companies with foreign investors, there existed a problem 
of the fluctuating of the exchanging rate of foreign currencies. To solve this problem, some 
special measures have been made, which will be explained later in the next chapter. Since 
the private partners, especially those with foreign investors may not be so familiar with the 
government's policies and capabilities, even the business environment in China, they would 
easily reach agreements with the government's promises, especially when the government 
needed funding while the private investors needed projects (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 
2010). Some risk like "Tariff change", "Payment risk" and "Subjective evaluation" may 
eventually occur. Some feasibility studies and contract negation, in which both parties are 
involved, will be needed in arder ta handle these risks. Thus the responsibility is equally 
shared. 
IV . Risks ta be mostly allocated ta the private sector 
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The resul ts of the survey indicate that fi ftee n ri sks out of the total 4 1 should be 
mostly allocated to the pri vate sectors, which are F23 "Constructi on Changes" , 
F24 "Contracts w i th Excessive Vari ati on", F25"Construction Cost Overrun", 
F26"Construction Delay", F2 8"Supporting Utiliti es Ri sk", F29 "Techno logy Risk", 
F30"Operati on Changes", F3 1 "Operation Cost Overrun", F32"Conso rtium Inability", 
F33 "Maintenance Ri sk", F37 "Organi zation and Coordination Ri sk", F3 8" lnadequacy of 
Knowledge", F39 "Pri vate Investor Change", F40"Third Party Re liability", and F41 " Staff 
Crises" . 
Ail the risks that belong to thi s category have one thing in common, that is they are 
a il related to the management ability and technical skills provided by the private sector. 
Thus it is reasonable that the private sector should take more responsibility of these risks. 
As defined in the term "PPP" by the Efficiency Unit (2008), the public and private 
sectors both bring theiï complementary skills to a ppp project for the sake of providing 
public services more effi ciently. Consequently, onl y the priva te partn ers who are 
comparative ly more effi cient in the construction or operation than the public sector are 
considered as a qualified inves tor for a PPP project. Furthermore, as one of the big reasons 
fo r the publi c sector to promote PPP implementati on is the shortage of funding, the private 
partner should guarantee their capabili ties and availabilities of financial resources or their 
ability of finding lenders in the financi al market. 
lt is agreed in the a llocation schemes fo r most of PPP proj ects in the world that the 
risks related to the project's construction and operation should be ass igned to the private 
partner, such as "Technology ri sk" , "Cost overrun" etc. Besides, the ri sks for the 
relat ionships between parties are usually associated with the day-to-day requirements of the 
project (Ke, Wang, & C han, 2010), it is appropriate that risks cO l1cerned thi s aspect rest 
more with the pri vate secto r. According to the q of the Bird Nest Project, the results turned 
out to be in acco rdance wi th the findin gs in the previous research for PPPs. However, there 
st ill ex ists some diffe rence between the Bird Nest Proj ect and the other PPPs due to its own 
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particularities. In the next chapter, the differences will be elaborated in the comparison of 
the ppp projects within and between countries. 
v. Risks to be solely allocated to the private sector 
In our survey, the risk F27 Design Risk is the risk with the highest score 4.87, which 
is over 4.5 and thus this risk is considered the only risk which is to be solely allocated to 
the private sector. According to the previous research of the risk allocation of ppp in China 
by Professor Wang, no risk was solely allocated to the private sector, which indicated that 
government 's objective of risk transfer from public sector to private sector is not completed 
and not as weil as other countries. But in this Bird Nest Project, according to our survey 
results, thi s transfer is better done than the other cases in China, which showed us a 
progress made in the ppp system in China. Why the private party undertook more of the 
risk in design and how they reacted to share the risk will be explained in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION AROUND THE CASE STUDY 
In this chapter, the di scussion will be divided into two parts. In the first part, a further 
exp lanation will be given to the three new added ri sks arising in the Bird Nest Project as 
weil as sorne top high risks in this project. Sorne measures and reactions taken by the 
government will be presented in order to explain how these risks were mitigated and 
balanced between the public and private sectors. While in the second part, comparisons of 
the ri sk management of ppp proj ects in different countries will be made. We will firstly 
compare the ri sk management of the Bird Nest Project with that of other carried out ppp 
projects in China, so that we can see the improvement for ppp ri sk management in China. 
T hen, status of ri sk management of ppp in western countries wi ll be compared with the 
situation in China, so that we can find out the gap of ppp system between deve loped 
countries and developing countries and where we can put our effort on to catch up with the 
fas t development of skills and technologies in the field of management of project. 
4.1 I ND IVIDUAL RI SK FACTOR ANALYS IS 
4.1.1 PARTICULAR RISKS IN THE PROJECT 
• F42 Competitions with ex isting stadiums. 
Once the Bird Nest National Stadium is completed, it has to face a competition with 
the other ex isting stadiums in Beijing, as weil as the other sports fac ilities ail around our 
capital Beijing. This risk was brought out in the second round of the Delphi survey by the 
respondents from the private companies. The final average score of this risk factor is 3.98, 
which means that it is mostly the private consortium 's responsi bili ty to handle this risk. The 
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private investo rs have been wo rried about the poss ible competitions with other stad iums 
which may have a bad effect on their future income of the project. Another reason that may 
generate thi s risk is that the government may invest in the buildings of other new stad iums 
in the city during the concession period, which will also reduce the private investors' 
income from the project. 
In order to assure the benefits of the private partners to attract their investrnent, 
government has made sorne explanations taken sorne special measures as fo llows: 
1) Accordi ng to a pre-survey of the ex isting stadiurns, there are abo ut 142 
ex isting stadiums in Beijing, both urban are as and suburbs counted in. 
However, none of the existing ones could be compared to the Bird Nati onal 
Stadium in aspects such as scales, equipment, and popularity. What 's rnore, 
sorne of them are not only srnall but also obsolete due to their long existing 
period. Therefore the competition a1110ng stadiums \vou!d be li ttle during t}1e 
concession period. So the private investors should not have too rnany 
worries about the occurrence of the competitions ' bad effects. 
2) The Beijing Municipal Govermnent has made a special regul ation in the 
project ' s contract, which is "During the concession period, BMG will not 
permit to deve lop new competitive stadium or ex pand any existing 
competitive stadium in northern are a of Beijing" . Thus, this risk allocated 
mostly to the private sector is mitigated. 
• F43 Dispute among the private partners themse lves 
Due to the large scale of this Bird Nest ppp project, the Project Consortium is made 
of three large and well-known enterprises (CITIC , BUCGC, GSHGC) with a long business 
hi story and abundant investment experience. Among them, CITIC is a large trans-national 
cong lomerate with 44 subsidi aries ail over the world ; BUCGC is one of the largest and 
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most excellent State-owned constructi on enterpri se; and GSHGC is an international group 
company specialized in infrastructure construction of which the head office is in the United 
States. Since aIl of the three companies are very competiti ve, the di sputes among them fo r 
how to share the interests and profits are accordingly frequent and strong . 
First of ail , the total profit of the proj ect's construction is di vided into three parts with 
the same proportion of each investor's equity in the Project Consortium . As a result , the 
share of the profit di spersed the Project Consortium 's control over the project's 
construction and caused divergences on decision-making. Secondly, the BUCGC, as the 
general contractor for the project, who undertakes the most responsibility of des ign work 
and the construction, had put its emphasis more on its own profits, time and safety more 
than that for the overall proj ect. Thi s leads to the construction co st overrun and time delay 
risk. And government can hardl y do anything to prevent thi s which makes thi s ri sk to 
become another ri sk which is considered to be so lely allocated to the private sector. 
Actually, thi s ri sk is considered to be among the highest ones in the Bird Nest 
Project. As a seri ous of problems concerning the stadium ' s design have occurred during the 
project' s construction, the di sputes are constant and government has to make sorne 
compensation for the loss in order to have the stadium completed in time for the 2008 
Olympics . 
• F44 Change and Terminati on of concession 
According to the ppp Guide Book, the concess ion peri od refers to the durat ion for 
which the agreement has been signed. During thi s peri od, the pri vate partner is permitted to 
levy fee and is li able fo r maintaining the facili ty ; once the concession period is over, the 
property of the project will be completely handed over to the government. In the Bird Nest 
Project, the pri vate sector obtained a concession peri od of up to 30 years, which mean that 
in the first 30 years after the stadium is fini shed, the private consortium will run, fi nance 
and main tain the stadium, and al! rights wo uld be transferred to government after 30 years . 
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However, there is a risk of either extending thi s period or termi nating the period 
before its expiry. As a matter of fac t, in order to avo id fa lling into the same tragedy as of 
"Mo ntreal T rap", the private conso rt ium ceded the concession agreement in 2009, only one 
year aftel' its independent operation. The "Montreal Trap" is a stol'y happened in 1976, right 
after the 2 1 th Olympic Games held in Montreal. The income of the Olympic Stadium in 
Mo ntreal turned out to be far less than the government had expected, which eventuall y 
caused a big 10ss of 10 mi llion US doll ars. The local gove rnment was obliged to co llect a 
spec ial tax to pay off this large amount of debt which took more than twenty years. This 
became a big nightmare for not only Montreal but also ail other investors for Olympic 
stad iums as wei l. Unfo rtunately, the Bil'd Nest Stadium turned out to be facing the same 
problem. 
It was claimed by the Beij ing lnvestment Company that, s tnce the Bird Nest 
Stad ium' s opening to public from October 2008 to May 2009, the tota l profi t was abo ut 
260 million yuan. The sources of the income included three parts: entrance tickets f rom 
tourists, concerts and art performances, and the selling of licensed merchandise. However, 
taking into account the annuaJ maintenance cost of up to 60 million yuan and the interest 
paid on loans from banks , the anl1ual rurming co st of the stadium reached almost 100 
million yuan. Furthermore, in accordance with the present national accounting standards in 
Chi na, the depreciat ion of the stadium as a fi xed asse t should al so be taken into account. 
During the 30 years' concession period, the stadium was estimated to cost a deprec iati on 
fee of about 2,000 million yuan. This means that the private investor could hardl y gain any 
profi ts but only to pay fo r the stadium ' s depreciation co st fo r the government. 
What's worse, the prospect fo r the operation of the Bird Nest Stadiul11 tS not as 
optimistic as it was expected. The Bird Nest Stadiul11 takes a constructi on area of 258 ,000 
square l11eters, with a business area of 7,740 square l11eters which takes the 35% of the to tal 
area. There are hote ls, restaurants, supermarkets, clubs and boutiques running in the 
business area of the Bird Nest Stadium, which makes profits fo r the private investors. 
Acco rding to the interv iew to Zhang hengli , the vice president of Nati onal Stadium 
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Company in February 2009, the main sources of the Bird Nest Stadium, in the future , will 
sti ll make profits t'rom the adverti sing, venue rentais, naming rights sold to the activities 
such as art performances and sports competitions. In fact, ev en the Super Football Games , 
China' s currently largest sports game, can only sale 50,000 tickets per match. The club 
investors were discouraged by the high additional costs of the alterations and operations for 
the Bird Nest Stadiurn . After one year of independent operation, the business 
transformation of the stadium still needed improvements, and the bid for the exclusive 
naming rights was not succeeded . Consequently, the tourism business which was originally 
considered as a sidel ine business has become the biggest source of incorn e of the Bird Nest. 
Taken ail the present situati ons and predictions into cons ideration, the private 
consortium 's original est imati on of co llecting the initial investment fo r the project of 450 
bi llion yuan within the 30 years of concession period seems to be impossible. There is a 
danger of putting on the same tragic scene of the "Montreal Trap" again. 
To avo id the big loss, on August 20 t\ 2009, an agreement was signed by Beijing 
Muni cipal Government and the Private Consortium to share thi s ri sk. The agreement 
consisted two parts: 1. the operati on of the Bird Nest Stadium was changed into the share-
holding system, in which BMG held 58% equity while the remai ning 42% was held by the 
Private Consortium; 2. the former management system of the private sector's independent 
operation of the stadi um was adjusted. A National Stadium Company owned by the 
government took over the responsibilities of the running, operating and maintaining of the 
Bird Nest Stadium, with the support and supervision of the local governrnent. Tt was later 
exposed by the medium that in the shareholding system reform, Beijing Municipal 
Government had actuall y changed its held shares into equity. The government will lead the 
operation of the stadi um and bear ail the losses and profits of the project. This means, same 
as the results of the questionnaire in which this risk gained a score of 1.71, the government 
finally would rnostly undertake the possible loss caused by this risk. 
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4.1.2 Top HIGH RISKS IN THE PROJECT 
According to risk factor ' s mean values for ranking, there are seven ri sk factor 
obtaining a score higher than 4. They are F27 Design Risk, F26 Construction Delay, F25 
Construction Cost Overrun, F 15 Market Demand Change, F38 Inadequacy of Knowledge, 
F37 Organization and Coordination Risk and F12 Foreign Exchange and Convertibility. 
These risks are considered high risks in the Bird Nest Project and th us worthy to be 
discussed and analyzed so that more attention can be paid to them in the risk management 
of other ppp projects. We will then start from the highest one F27 Design Risk. 
• F27 Design Risk 
As is shown in the results of the two-round Delphi Survey, the risk factor with the 
highest mean value in the ranking is F27 "Design Risk. " By collecting information from 
newspapers and internet and interviewing the professor who had participated in the research 
against the Bird Nest Project, this risk is elaborated as below. 
First of aU, there exist a contradiction regarding the design problem between the 
government and the Private Consortium. Since the stadium is built for the big spoli event in 
China' s capital city Beijing, Beijing Municipal Government played a key role in deciding 
the bille print of the architecture. BMG required the Private Consortium to follow their 
opinions without the occupation of the copyright for the Bird Nest Stadium 's design. This 
not only caused a problem for the Private Consortium in its negotiation with the design 
consultants companies, but also prevented the Private Consortium from maximiz ing the 
commercial using of the stadium which might lead to a loss of profits. 
Another big problem substantiaUy enhanced this risk is the cancellation of the 
retractable roof of the stad ium. This decision was finally made by the government in 
August 2004, several months after the project actually started. And the construction was 
continued in the end of the year with the revised design plan without the retractable roof. 
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This change in the design brought out both positive and negative impacts on the project of 
its own. The most important thing is this caused a lot of troubles to the private investors 
which made them undertook almost ail the bad effects of this risk. The reasons of the 
cancel lation of the retractable roof and the loss caused to the private sector have been given 
in the interview with Professor Wu, one of the assistants of Professor Wang shouqin ' s 
study of the ppp projects in China. The conclusion is made as follows. 
Firstly, why the government decided to cancel the retractable roof? 
To reduce the consuming of raw material ; 
According to a report made by the chief designer of the 8ird Nest Stadium at the 93th 
China 's Science and Technology Conference, it was estimated that the cancellation of the 
roof can save at least 3700 tons of steel material which was supposed to be used in the 
supporting structure and the retractable roof, since the re-designed stadium reduced the load 
of the steel structure and saved many other parts . 
To simplify the installation of the steel structure; 
The structure of the unique wide span retractable roof is extremely complicated and 
difficult to be installed. The retractable roof, measured by 80m x 80m x 8m (Iength, width, 
height), has a stee l space truss rigid unit composed of two parts which co vers the entire 
open space of the stadium. The steel structure moves along the fixed rail on the permanent 
roof to get opened and closed. The fixed slide rail is underpinned by the rigid member al 
the front edge of the permanent roof with a distance of 85 meters. Due to this complex 
structure, the high cost and safety of the installation of the retractab le roof still remained an 
unsolved problem, regardless the research of finding proper ways installing the roof. Thus, 
the canceling of the retractable will doubtlessly make the construction of the stadium a lot 
easler. 
To save money for the construction of the stadium 
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In the repoli of the chief designer, it was indicated that about 400 milli on yuan can be 
saved in the stadium 's construction by canceling the retractable roof. As marked in the 
tendering document, the maximum co st fo r the construction of the Bird Nest Stadium is set 
to be 4,000 million yuan, whereas the winner of the design competition offered a plan with 
a cost of 3,890 mill ion yuan. However, in the Feasibility Study Report submitted later by 
the National Stadium Company, the estimation of the total cost of installing was reduced to 
2,670 million yuan. Thus, our National Development and Reform Commi ss ion approved a 
fi nal amount of 3, 130 million yuan in the investment fo r the Bird Nest program. With the 
help of optimization work by the Private Consortium's design consultants, the installation 
cost of the Bird Nest was cut down to 2,630 million yuan in the design phase. The ultimate 
evaluation of the total construction cost after the decision of the canceling the retractable 
roof had been made reached to an amount less than 2,267 billion yuan, which we il satisfied 
the nation's and the governn1ent 's original concept of " Host the Olympie Games 
Fïügally" . 
To reduce probability of malfuncti ons in using the stadium. 
The Bird Nest Stadium is regarded as the most fashionable design of the fo urth era 
architecture of the world. And no stadium of thi s kind has actuall y been completed so far. 
The retractable roof has a size almost as large as an international stanclardized foot ball 
fie ld, with a total weight of 1,700 tons. With such huge vo lume and heavy weight, the 
opening and closing movement of the retractable roof may encounter some malfunctioned 
problems and may threaten the stadium 's and the audience's safety . Consequently, the 
cancelation of the ret ractable roof will successfull y avo id such safety ri sks. 
Seconcll y, what's the pri vate sector's loss in canceling the retractable roof? 
Cause the claim from Design Consortium 
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The re-design of the stadium without the retractable roof led to a large amount of 
workloads in modifying and changing in the steel structure's design. As a result, the 
Design Consortium as part of the Private Consortium, which is consisted of the designers 
from Beijing Urban Architecture Company and consultants from Project Management 
Advisors, claimed a total of 40 million yuan for the renewing of the design, which was 
almost one third of the initial overall design cost 120 million yuan. 
Cause the cost overrun and time delay 
Due to the numerous disputes against the cancellation of the retractable roof, the 
government had invited groups of experts to discuss and evaluate the feasibility of the 
cancellation. After several rounds of discussion and negotiation, the government finally 
achieved a consensus with the Private Consortium on the canceling proposa!. Anyway, the 
redesign took time and the current construction of the stadium had to be terminated for a 
while. After ail, it caused a time delay of half a year for the construction schedule for the 
project. However, as there exisanted a limit date for the construction of the stadium because 
of its special use for the Olympic event, the main structure of the stadium has to be finished 
by the end of 2006. Many advanced techniques were adopted to accelerate the construction 
process, which obviously demanded an extra amount of cost overrun paid mainly by the 
main contractor in the Private Consortium BUCGC. Thus BUCGC claimed that these 
additional technical costs should be shared by ail members in the Private Consortium. But 
the Private Consortium refused to pay for that as the y insisted that the Beijing Municipal 
Government was mostly responsible for the change in design and should accordingly bear 
ail the overrun costs. As the disputes under this problem are still under negotiation now, the 
private partner BUCGC has unfortunately undertook the cost overrun loss. 
Influence on the stadium ' s operation after Olympics 
Although the cancellation of the retractable roof can reduce part of the operation fee 
as it saved the cost in opening and closing process for the roof as well as the maintenance 
cost for the roof. However the Private Consortium claimed this would not count much as 
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every year there will be no more than 10 times of the total movement of the retractable 
roof. What 's worse, without the retractable roof, the stadium was turned into a completely 
open air stad ium . The weather condition may become a restriction to the various activities 
held in the stadium. For example , the unexpected rai n may cancel or cause bad effects on 
the shows ' quality. Hence the stadium may lose a lot of chances in the renting business 
whi ch led to a reduction in the stadium 's revenue. Besides, the retractable roof was 
supposed to be the unique characteristic of the Bird Nest Stadium which endowed the 
stadium an outstanding brand value. The cancellation of the retractable roof led to the sold 
of the name ri ght of the Bird Nest Stadium still in vain. This aroused a lot of worries of the 
private investors in the consorti um. 
[n conclusion , as it is analyzed above, in this project, the private sector undertook 
most of the bad consequences caused by the design ïisk, which makes it ïeasonable that, in 
the survey result, the respondents gave the design risk a quite low score and have it 
allocated solely to the private sector. Meanwhile, since the change of the design led to so 
many disputes and economical loss, especially big troubles to the private sector, it was 
agreed to be the highest risk in the Bird Nest Proj ect, which can be a good warning to the 
simi lar projects in the design process in order to avoid such kind ofloss. 
• F26 Construction Delay 
Due to the high complexity and technology standard for the construction of the Bird 
Nest Stadium, the construction planning took a very long period . In the time when Beijing 
Municipal Government signed the Concession Agreement with the Private Consortium on 
August 9, 2003, i t was req uested that the construction of the stadi um should be finished by 
December 31 , 2006, which allowed a three-year period for the construction process. 
Apparentl y, this construction schedule was not very feasible and reasonable, not taking into 
account any probable changes of the des ign. This gave the Private Consortium a great 
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pressure in the construction, especially with the change of the design plan by canceling the 
retractable roof. Th us the delay in the construction is unavoidable. The private sector had 
to mostly undertake this risk. 
• F25 Construction Cost Overrun 
The Bird Nest Stadium is the first stadium with a 3D steel frame in China, and the 
installation is very complex with a lot of parts being incised and weld for two or three 
times. The special inflated ETFE cushions' installation need quite innovative technical 
ski ll s and abundant experience. Furthermore, the nest-like steel structure of the stadium 
brought out a lot of problems to be solved in its fabrication, installation and maintenance. 
Ali the se increased complexity led to a huge co st overrun that completely destroyed the 
original balance sheet of the project's financial budget. As a matter of fact, the private 
sector had to pay most of the extra bill caused by this risk. 
• FIS Market Demand Change 
Since the Bird Nest Stadium 1S the most pre-eminent and the largest sport and 
performance faci lity with the most international-advanced high technical and 
environmenta l-fri endl y features among ail the present sports venues in China, the Private 
Consortium gave a comparative ly high expectation for the stadium 's demand in the market. 
An estimati on was made that there would be 16 large-scale activities held in the stadium, 
including non-commercial government-run big events, private enterprises large-scale 
performance, and ail sorts of sports competitions. In addition, due to its high popularity 
brought by the 2008 Olympics, the stadium could also absorb a considerab le sum of profits 
in the tourism industry. Unfortunatel y, the real situation is far less optimistic than it had 
been expected. 
In the 1 ight of market survey during the first year of the stadium' s operation after the 
Olympie Games, on ly 4 large-scale shows had taken place in the Bird Nest Stadium, 
including one drama performance and three concerts, with the rentai fee of 4.5 million yuan 
per day which is much higher than the average rentai fee required by other stadiums in 
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Beij ing. Due to the high rentai cost, some organizers of the spo rts and art events had to 
make another chose instead of the Bird Nest Stadium. As for the deveiopment of the 
tourism, in the fi rst one year after the Olympic, the Bird Nest had attracted 3.08 milli on 
tourists from ail ove r the world. The price of the entrance ticket was set at 50 yuan per 
person. The total income from the so ld of the entrance tickets was up to 154 milli on yuan. 
Although thi s amount presentl y achieved the private investors ' initial des ire, the touristic 
income will grad ually decrease with the fading of the Olympics ' heat. No one can 
guarantee the profi ts in tourism would still even exist after a few years . 
Although in the public sector had shown its support by setting special rules in the 
concession agreement to reduce the potential competitors in the market, the Private 
Consortium had already a large budget deficits due to the small market demand . In order to 
miti gate this risk, the Private Consortium had made sorne improvements in the previous 
mode of operati on, aiming to change the stadium into a multi-functional industry product. 
The commercial performances will be divided into day-show and night-show. During 
daytime, the performance mainly includes small-scale shows and extreme sports show; 
whereas during the night, large-scale and high qualified performances will be provides. The 
revised operation plan can not only expand the range of various kinds of performance he Id 
in the stadium, but also attract those clients who do not have too much budgets in their 
shows. However, due to the ex isted budget deficits for the Private Conso rtium, this ri sk is 
still considered a high risk according to the average ranking sco re it gained in the survey 
results. 
• F38 Inadequacy of Knowledge 
Due to the unique charac teristics of the Bird Nest National Stadium, the potential and 
future cli ents could be from ail sorts of companies and different sc ales of enterp ri ses both 
domestic and abroad. It is very important for the Private Consortium to build a friendly 
coope rati ve relationship with ail relevant organizations, for example , regiona l and national 
sports federat ions, State Ministry of Culture, State Ministry of Communications, fore ign 
affa ire agencies , State Sports Admini stration etc. 
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Since it is the first time for the Private Consortium to run such a big sport faci lity, 
they lack the experi ence and know-how of operating the stadium, as well as skil ls in 
developing good relationship with ail other domestic and foreign enterprises . However the 
Private Consortium signed a strategic operational agreement with Stade de France, a 
consultant company which can provide efficient operational technology and transfer know-
how smoothly to the Private Consortium, this plan was eventually terminated due the large 
budget deficits for the Private Consortium. The Private Consortium had to finall y face this 
risk on its own. Some countermeasures have been taken to alleviate the burden on the 
Private Consortium in the operational working. For instance, the Private Consortium had 
the parking lot outside of the Bird Nest Stadium subi et to an advertisement company. In 
this way, not only the advertisement company can earn profits from putting advertisements 
in the parking lot around the stadium, but this also help the Private Consortium run part of 
the stadium. 
• F37 Organization and Coordination Risk 
A few problems have emerged in the coordination due to sorne disputes between the 
public sector and the private sector. First, there are argues about how many parking spaces 
should be set in stadium's parking lot. The government required the Private Consortium to 
cut off 1000 parking spaces for the stadium in order to save mores spaces for the Olympic 
areas. This caused inconvenient of parking around the stadium and aroused the private 
investors ' dissatisfaction. Moreover, the cancellation of the retractable roof and the 
government 's restriction on the commercial use of the stadium also caused a lot of disputes . 
However, due to the government's political power and the stadium's main use of 2008 
Olympics, the Private Consortium had to follow the government's instructions and satisfy 
the public demands regardless the probable loss of profits. However the government has set 
some special rules for the private sector's interest as compensation, this risk still remains 
high and is allocated most to the private sector. 
• F 12 Foreign Exchange and Convertibility 
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As the finance of the Bird Nest Project in vo lved the loan From Foreign banks and 
Foreign investors , the f10ating of the Fo reign exchange rate is a hi gh risk to both the public 
and the private sectors. ln order to equall y share this risk between two sectors, a threshold 
for the exchange rate was set to share the higher or lower revenues caused by this risk. The 
US dollars ' portion of the operating tari ff would be adjusted From time to time in 
accordance with the variations in the US$ to RMB$ exchange rate. The threshold was set at 
6%, which means the Beijing Municipal Government would bore the consequences caused 
by this risk when the exchange rate was below 6%, while the Private ConsOliium took the 
risk when the rate is over 6%. In thi s way, thi s ri sk is fairly shared. 
4.2 COMPARlSONS FOR THE STUDY 
4.2.1 Bird Nest Proj ect VS ppp Proj ects in China 
Compared to the research of risk allocation in China 's ppp proj ects accomplished by 
Professor Wang and hi s ass istants, no big difference appeared in the Bird Nest Stadium 
Project. The risk facto r "Expropriation and Nationali zation" is the onl y risk that to be so lely 
allocated to the public secto r in both of the two studies. Ali the risks that related to po litics 
and government policies and rul es are a l! agreed to be mostly allocated to the pub li c sector. 
The ri sks concerned the proj ect itse lf, especially those in the project 's construction and 
operation processes, are mostl y allocated to the private sector, while ail other risks are 
considered to be equall y shared between the public and the private sectors as both sectors 
are equall y involved in the risk events and have same responsibilities to deal with the ri sks. 
The unique thing that makes the Bird Nest Project different from the general s ituat ion 
of risk management of PPPs in China is that: in Professor Wang 's research , no risk fell into 
the category that should be solel y allocated to the private sector , while in the Bird Nest 
Project, the risk factor " Design Risk" was considered so le ly allocated to the private sector 
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according to the respondents of the two-round Delphi Survey. This risk has become a 
specific in this case for the reason that a big change of the design has to be executed due to 
the Olympics special social and public influence and importance. Although the Private 
Consortium was doomed to bear sorne loss because of this change in design, they could 
hardly do anything do be against this decision. Consequently, the private sector took most 
of the responsibility of the risk. However, this is not always the case in other ppp projects 
in China, but this survey result is meaningful and valuable to other ppp projects of which 
the outcome with same characteristics as this large national sports stadium. For example, 
for other countries who are about to hold the Olympic Games in the future , they should pay 
special attention to the design problems in order to avoid such loss, especially for the 
private sector. 
Moreover, if we take a closer look at the risks to be mostly allocated to the private 
sector, we can easily find out that, in the Bird Nest Project, 15 risks out of 41 are 
considered to be mostly allocated to the private sector, which represents 36.59% of ail risks 
items listed in Table 6, whereas in Professor Wang's research, only 27.03% of ail the 
catalogued risk items are to be mostly allocated to the private sector. This is persuasive 
evidence that the Bird Nest Project has successfully made a better transfer of the risks from 
public sector to the private sector, which is the main objective of the ppp mode. This 
represents a significant improvement in China' s practice in ppp projects and helps us to 
build confidence in the future development in PPPs in China. With more and more 
experience in PPPs as weil as the research findings of PPP, China can do better and better 
in the management of PPP projects. 
4.2.2 ppp IN CHINA VS ppp IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
In Li 's research of the allocation of risk in PPP construction projects 111 the UK, 
which also classify the risk factors into macro , meso and micro levels, he found out that 
most of the macro and micro level risks are either to be retained within the public sector or 
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to be shared between both the public sector and the private sector ; The majority of the ri sks 
concerned with the ppp proj ect itselC especially those in the meso level , shouid be mostl y 
allocated to the private sector (Ke , Wang, & Chan , 20 10). 
However, in our research, as it is shown in the table 8 , the result of risk allocation, 
we can easily conclude that the common point shared by both China and UK is that risks 
belonged to the mesa level are mostly allocated to the public sector and risks of marco leve 
are considered to be mostly allocated to the public sector; the difference is that the ri sks in 
the micro level are more allocated to the private sector in the Bird Nest ppp project in 
China than that in UK' s ppp projects. Interestingly, in the UK construction projects, 32 out 
of the total 46 risks, which represents 69.57% of ail the catalogued risk items were 
allocated to the private sector (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2010), while in the Bird Nest Proj ect, 
36.59 of all the listed risks are allocated to the private sector. This may suggest that ppp 
procurement for construction projects in China has not achieved the objective of risk 
transfer from the public sector to the private sector such as in UK (Ke, Wang, & Chan , 
2010) . Neverthe less, some risks ' allocation should strongly depend on the specifie 
characteristics of the project itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of the risk management 
of ppp projects in China. The ppp mode is widely adopted in the infrastructure projects in 
China in order to ach ieve multiple proj ect objectives and to mitigate project risks . By using 
the ppp approach, not only the financial burden is shared with the inj ection of funds from 
the private investors, but they also bring in their skill s in the management of projects and 
improve the effectiveness in ri sk management in running the projects. 
By referring to the Bird Nest Stadium Project for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, this 
paper examines the major risks in the implementation of thi s ppp project, as weil as how 
the risks were shared between the public and the private sectors. The risks were identified 
and divided into 12 groups in accordance with their different nature. A two-round Delphi 
survey was conducted to find out how the risks were allocated and what the major ri sks 
were in thi s project. Tt is found that risks regarding the political , legal aspects are 
considered more allocated to the public sector, while those regarding the project itself, su ch 
as construction, operation risks were more allocated to the private sector as they can better 
manage them with their speciali zed experience and ski ll s. Besides the design ri sk is proved 
to be the highest risk in thi s stadium construction project which warned us that special 
attention should be paid in the design process in the similar proj ects to avo id trouble and 
loss. 
An interview with an expert on the ppp research in China was developed to give a 
better description of the status-quo of the application of ppp in China and the main 
problems in managing the ppp projects. Tt was indicated that although the ri sks were better 
transferred (0 the private sector in this Bird Nest project compared with the previous ppp 
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projects in China, ri sks were more allocated to the public sector than those in the ppp 
projects in weste rn counties. The management skills of ppp in China should be improved 
and regulations for ppp should be standardized fo r the future development of ppp proj ects 
in China. 
CONCLUSION GÉNÉRALE 
Le but de cette étude était d'acquérir une mei lleure compréhension de la gestion des 
risques des projets ppp en Chine. Le mode ppp est largement adopté dans les projets 
d'infrastructure en Chine afin d'atténuer les risques du projet. En effet, grâce à l'approche 
PPP, le fardeau financier se partage entre les partenaires. De la même façon, le capital de 
compétences (techniques ou de gestion) des firmes privées permettent également de 
s'assurer d'une saine gestion des projets . 
En se référant au projet du stade olympique de Pékin, cette recherche nous a permis 
d'examiner les principaux risques dans la mise en œuvre du PPP. Elle nous a ainsi permis 
de comprendre comment les risques ont été partagés entre le secteur public et le secteur 
privé. Suite à une enquête de type Delphi, les risques ont été identifiés et répartis en 
fonction de leur nature en 12 groupes. Il a été constaté que les risques concernant les 
aspects politiques, juridiques ont été alloués au secteur public, tandis que ceux concernant 
le projet lui-même comme la construction ou les risques d'exploitation ont été fréquemment 
affectés au secteur privé. Nous avons aussi découvert que la conception du stade a été 
l'étape la plus risquée. De fait, les coûts additionnels engendrés par cette étape auraient pu 
être év ités si une meilleure gestion des risques avait été faite . Toute chose égale par 
ailleurs, on peut en déduire qu'une attention toute particulière devrait être accordée dans le 
processus de conception de projets similaires , afin d'éviter les complications et les pertes 
qui en découlent. 
Une entrevue avec un expert chinois en PPP a aussi été effectuée pour valider les 
principaux problèmes et risques identifiés lors de notre enquête Delphi. Ce dernier nous a 
confirmé que la liste des risques était valide. Il nous a également fait remarquer que dans ce 
projet Nid d'oiseau , par rapport aux projets de PPP antérieurs en Chine, les risques ont été 
mieux transférés vers le secteur privé. Il nous a également rappelé que les risques affectés 
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au secteur public ont été plus nombreux que ceux que l'on retrouve généralement dans les 
projets ppp en Occident. 
Finalement, suite à cette étude, et afin d 'optimi se r le déve loppement futur de projets 
ppp en Chine, il serait souhaitable que les compétences en gesti on de projet devraient êt re 
améliorées et que la réglementation touchant les ppp devrait être plus normali sée. 
ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Sir/Madame, 
Hello! 
1 am honored that 1 could have this chance to communicate with you on my research 
and hope that we could receive your precious support. This research ai ms to find out, rank, 
and allocate ail the risk factors encountered in the Bird Nest Project for 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games. Ali the results will be contributed to the future similar ppp projects and 
will be used in my graduate thesis for the master degree in Gestion de Projet of the 
Université du Québec à Rimouski. 
A. Respondents ' Information 
1. Types of organization 
o State-owned enterprises 
o Private companies 
o Government 
2. Average turnover (per year) of the company the y working for(RMB dollars) 
o Less than 50 million 
o 50 million - 1 billion 
o More than 1 billion 
3. Years of worki ng experiences in management of project 
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o Less than 5 years 
o 5-1 0 years 
o More than 10 years 
4. Numbers of parti cipated ppp proj ects 
o Less than 4 
o 4-8 proj ects 
o More than 8 projects 
B. Risk Factor Survey 
Through literature reading and information collection on the Bird Nest Proj ect, a 
total of 41 risk facto rs are listed in the table as per attached. Based on your management 
experi ence in the Bird Nest Proj ect, please score each ri sk factor in the foll owing two 
co lumns acco rding to the criteria as beJow: 
.:. Column 1 Allocation: 
• " 1" - GovenU11 ent takes sole responsibi lity; 
• "2" - Government takes the majority responsibil ity; 
• "3" - Both public and pri vate sectors share equal responsibili ty ; 
• "4" - Private sector takes the majority responsibility; 
• "5" - Pri vate sector takes so le responsibility . 
• :. Column 2 Ranking: 
• " 1" - super 10w 
• "2" - 10w 
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• "3" - medium 
• "4" - high 
• " 5" - veryhigh 
The definition of each ri sk factor is also attached wi th the questionnaire in order 
to ensure that al! respondents have the same understanding of each risk and score them in 
the background at an even level. 
( Risk Risk Factor (RF) Me Me 
roup Factor F an an 
ID Category ID Value l Val ue2 
Group 
(Ali (Ra 
ocation) nking) 
( Politic Government 's Intervention 
1 al l 
Ex propriation and 
2 Nationalization 
Government's Reliability 
3 
Corruption 
4 
Political Opposition 
5 
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Poor Political Decision 
6 Making 
C Legal Immature Juristi c System 
2 7 
Change in Law 
8 
Change in Tax Regulation 
9 
Tari ff Change 
10 
C Macro Interest Rate 
3 economical 11 
Foreign Exchange and 
12 Convertibility 
Inflation 
13 
C Social Public Opposition 
4 14 
Market Demand Change 
15 
C Natura Geotechnical Conditions 
5 1 16 and Weather 
Force Majeure 
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,--
17 
Environmental Protection 
18 
C Prepar Land Acquisition 
6 ation and 19 
Star-up 
Competition for Exc lusive 
20 Right 
Uncompetitive Tender 
21 
Subjective Evaluation 
22 
C Constr Construction Changes 
7 uction 23 
Contracts with Excessive 
24 
Variation 
Construction Cost Overrun 
25 
Construction Delay 
26 
Design Risk 
27 
C Operat Supporting Utilities Risk 
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8 lOn 28 
Technology Risk 
29 
Operation Changes 
30 
Operation Cost Overrun 
31 
C Super Consortium Inability 
9 
.. 
32 VISlOn 
Maintenance Ri sk 
33 
C Projec Financial Risk 
10 t Finance 34 
Payment Risk 
3S 
Insuffic ient Financial Audit 
36 
G Public Organization and 
11 Sector - 37 Coordination Risk 
Private 
Sector 
Inadequacy of Knowledge 
38 
Relationship 
Private Investor Change 
39 
12 
D 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C Third 
Party 40 
41 
Risk Factor 
Governrnent' s 
Intervention 
Expropriation 
N ationalization 
Government' s 
Reliability 
Corruption 
and 
Political Opposition 
Poor 
Decision Making 
Political 
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Third Party Reliability 
Staff Crises 
Definition 
Public sector interferes unreasonably ln 
privatized facilities/services. 
Due to political , social or economic pressures , 
local governrnent takes over the facility run by 
private firm without glvmg reasonable 
compensation. 
The reliability and creditworthiness of the 
government to be able and willing to honor their 
obligations in future. 
Corrupt local government official demand 
bribes or unjust rewards. 
Delay or refusaI of project approval and permit 
bylocalgovernment. 
Government officiaI s considers more their 
career achievement or short-term goals or personal 
interests, or with !ittle PPP experience etc. , resulting 
in a poor political decision-making process . 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
Il 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Immature 
System 
Juristic The lack of national ppp law leads to diffe rent 
Change in Law 
Change 
Regulation 
m 
Tariff Change 
Interest Rate 
Tax 
Foreign Exchange 
and Convertib i1ity 
Inflation 
Public Opposition 
ways of ppp implementation in different places in 
China. 
Local government ' s inconsistent app lication of 
new regulations and laws. 
Central or local government' s inconsistent 
application of tax regulation. 
Improper tariff design or inflexible adjustment 
framework leading to the insuffic ient income. 
Unanticipated local interest rate due to 
immature local economic and banking systems. 
Fluctuation in currency exchange rate and/ or 
difficulty of convertibility. 
Unanticipated local inflation rate due to 
immature local econornic and banking systems. 
Prejudice from public due to different local 
li ving standards, values, culture, social system, etc. 
Market 
Change 
Demand Demand change from factors as social, 
Geotechnical 
Conditi ons and Weather 
Force Maj eure 
economic, environment, etc. 
Poor 
conditions . 
or unexpected ground/weather 
The circumstances that are out of the control of 
both foreign and local partners, such as flood, tires, 
storms, epidemic diseases, war hostilities and 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Environmental 
Protection 
Land Acquisition 
Competition 
exclusive-right 
Uncompetitive 
Tender 
Subjective 
Evaluat ion 
Construction 
Changes 
for 
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embargo. 
Stringent regulation which will have an impact 
on construction firms ' poor attention to 
environmental issues. 
The project land is unavailable, or unable to be 
occupied at the required time. 
The government does not offer the exclusive 
right, or does not honor to its commitment and build 
another competitive project. 
The tendering process and documents vary 
from project to project and from province to 
pro v 111ce 111 China without transparent or 
standardized models. 
Subjective evaluation and design of the 
concession period, tariff structure, market demand, 
etc . 
Unanticipated changes and errors 111 the 
construction resulting from the improper design. 
Con tracts with Improper arrangements 111 the contracts 
24 Excessive Variation including inappropriate risk allocation among 
stakeholders, commitment from public/private 
pminers. 
25 
Construction 
Overrun 
Cost Construction cost more than predicted or po or 
construction quality. 
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26 
27 
Construction Delay 
Design Risk 
Longer construction time than predicted or 
Subcontractors and suppliers not be ing able to 
supply labor or material on time. 
Delay in project approvals and permits due to 
design deficiency. 
Supporting Utilities Supporting utilities, such as electricity, water, 
28 Risk necessary for the construction, operation and 
management would not be available in a timel y 
manner or at fair rates. 
29 
30 
31 
Technology Risk 
Operation Changes 
The technology adopted not being mature or 
able to meet the requirements. 
Unanticipated changes and errors \l1 the 
operation resulting from poor investigation. 
Operation 
Overrun 
Co st Operation cost ovenun resulting from 
improper measurement, il! planned schedule or low 
operation efficiency. 
Consortium Inability The consortium not being able to perform its 
32 obligations as a ppp project company. 
Maintenance Risk Maintenance costs higher th an expected or 
33 more frequent than expected. 
Financial Risk Poor financial market or unavailability or 
34 financial instrument resulting di ffic ulty of financing. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Payment Risk 
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The consumer/government not being able or 
willing to pay, due to social or other reasons. 
Insufficient Financial The government or lenders would not perform 
a careful audit to the financial status of the project 
company. 
Aud it 
Organization 
Coordination Risk 
lnadequacy 
Knowledge 
Private 
Change 
Third 
Re liability 
Staff Crises 
and An increase of transaction cost or a dispute 
of 
may occur because of the improper organization and 
coordination between private and public sectors. 
Inadequate expenence lJ1 PPP/ Inadequate 
distribution of responsibilities and authority in 
partnershi p. 
Investor The government or lenders would not perform 
a careful audit to the financial status of the project 
company. 
Party The reliability and creditworthiness of a third 
party to be able and wi lling to honor their 
obligations in future. 
Conflicts or discordance among staff m or 
between departments. 
C. Any new risk added in the Bird Nest Projects, as weil as any other advices for the risk 
management in this project? 
End 
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Annex 2: Results of the questionnaire 
C Ri sk M M 
ro up Factor F ean ean 
ID Category ID Value1 A Value2 
Group Risk Factor (RF) llocatio 
(A n ( 
llocation Rankin 
) g) 
C Politic Government 's l. M 1 
1 al 1 Intervention 56 PB .89 
Expropriation and 1. S 0 
2 ational ization 14 PB .73 
Government 's 1. M 2 
3 Reliability 61 PB .24 
Corruption 2. M 3 
4 38 PB .23 
Political Opposition 
2. M 0 
Poor Political 
5 49 PB .88 
Decision Making 
1. M 1 
6 73 PB .85 
C Legal Immature J uristic 1. M 2 
2 7 System 71 PB .87 
Change in Law 1. M 2 
8 83 PB .24 
Change 111 Tax 
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Regulation 2. M 2 
9 23 PB .52 
Tariff Change 
2. M .., .J 
10 34 PB .02 
C Macro lnterest Rate 2. E 3 
3 economical Il 98 SH .82 
Foreign Exchange and 
Convertibility 3. E 4 
12 13 SH .51 
Inflation 
2. E 3 
13 76 SH .63 
C Social Public Opposition 2. E 3 
4 14 64 SH .20 
Market Demand 
Change 2. E 4 
15 53 SH .68 
C Natura Geotechnical 
.., 
E 2 .J. 
5 1 16 Conditions and Weather 01 SH .01 
Force Maj eure 3. E 
.., 
.J 
17 03 SH .07 
Environmental 
Protection 
.., 
E 3 .J. 
18 22 SH .10 
C Prepar Land Acquisition 1. M 0 
6 ation and 19 57 PB .98 
Competition for 
Star-up 
Exclusive Right 2. M 3 
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20 Uncompeti tive Tender 01 PB .22 
Subj ecti ve Evaluation l. M 2 
2 1 53 PB .98 
l. E 3 
22 89 SH .34 
G Constr Construction Changes 4. M 
7 uction 23 23 PR 3.99 
Contracts with 
Excessi ve Vari ation 3. M 3 
24 77 PR .08 
Construction Co st 
Overrun M 4 
25 4.1 2 PR .77 
Construction Delay 
M 4 
26 
Design Risk 
4.17 PR .79 
S 4 
27 4.87 PR .93 
G Operat Supporting Utilities 3. M 2 
8 Ion 28 Ri sk 97 PR .2 1 
Teclmology Risk 4. M 3 
29 12 PR .77 
Operation Changes 
4. M 3 
Operation Cost 
30 33 PR .38 
Overrun 
4. M 3 
31 28 PR .65 
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C Super Consortium Inability 4. M 
,.., 
J 
9 
. . 
32 35 PR .87 VISion 
Maintenance Risk 
,.., 
M 3 J. 
33 82 PR .76 
C Projec Financial Risk 2. E 
,.., 
J 
10 t Finance 34 76 SB .79 
Payment Risk 
3. E 3 
Insufticient Financial 
35 21 SB .46 
Audit 
3. E 2 
36 00 SB .66 
C Public Organization and 
,.., 
M 4 J. 
1 1 Sector - 37 Coordination Risk 63 PR .49 
Private 
Inadequacy of 4. M 4 
Sector 
38 Knowledge 18 PR .52 
Relationship 
Private Investor 4. M 
39 Change 44 PR 
C Th ird Third Party Reliability 4. M 2 
12 Party 40 06 PR .34 
Staff Crises 
4. M 1 
41 23 PR .68 
Competitions with 3. M 4 
Newly Added 
42 ex isting stadiums 98 PR .03 
Risks 
Dispute among the 4. S 4 
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43 pri vate partners themsel ves 83 PR .21 
Change or 1. M 4 
44 Termination of Concession 72 PB .18 
Note: SPB=solely to public; MPB=mostly to public; ESH= eq ually shared; MPR= 
mostly to private ; SPR= solely to private. 
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Annex 3: Transcript of the interview with Professor Wu (assistant of Professor Wang 
shouqin), participated in Wang's research in ppp projects in China, as weil as in the writing 
and translating of the book named "Case Studies of ppp projects in Asia and Europe", 
which published in China in 2010. (Interview produced on Monday July Il ,2011) 
~ Question J: Hello, Professor Wu, it is weIl known that your group of research led by 
Professor Wang shouqin has contributed a lot in the study of ppp projects, both in 
China and foreign countries. Can you please introduce us your main research 
achievements in the field of Public-Private Partnership? 
Professor Wang has been devoting himself into the ppp projects research since he 
was a Post-Doctoral Fello in Singapore Nanyang Technological University. He was not 
only involved in the research entitled "Risk Management of PPP projects in Developing 
Countries", but also contributed in several PFI/PPP papers ' publishing on the worId's top 
construction journals. He is now working as the vice dean of the Department of 
Construction Management and Institute of International Engineering Project Management 
in Tsinghua Uni versity, continuing his research in the field su ch as, Principal Investor in 
"Developing an Equitable Risk Sharing Mechanism for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
Projects in the People's Republic of China (RPC)" jointed funded by the National Natural 
Science Foundation of China and the Research Grant Committee of Hong Kong, Principal 
Investor of"Improved FinanciallEconomic Evaluation Method Incorporating Risk Analysis 
for PPP/BOT Projects" funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, 
Project Coordinator (China) of the Europe Union funded Asia-Link Project "EU-Asia 
Network of Competence Enhancement on Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) in 
Infrastructure Development" in which five universities (Germany-Weimar, UK-UMIST, 
China-Tsinghua, rndia-IIT, Thailand-AIT) are invo lved and led by Germany-Weimar's 
Prof. Dr. Hans Wilhelm Alfen , and also co llaborator of " Risk Management for 
Construction of Beijing 2008 Olympic Sport Venues" funded by BOCOG (Beijing 
Organization Committee for Olympic Games) etc. Besides he had tens and hundreds of 
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papers and reports publi shed in var ious international journals. And actually 1 used to be a 
doctoral student of his and now 1 am working for him as one of his assistant professol' and r 
have paliicipated in hi s worki ng of "Risk Management for Construction of Beijing 2008 
Olympie Sport Venues" funded by BOCOG (Beijing Organi zation Committee for Olympie 
Games) . 
~ Question 2: Well , actually 1 am writing a thesi s on the subject of ri sk management of 
ppp project in China as my graduate paper for the master degree in University of 
Quebec, and 1 am focusing on a case study of the risk management of the project "Bird 
Nest Stadium for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games" , Since you have ass isted Professor 
Wang in the research of "Risk Management for Construction of Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Sport Venues" funded by BOCOG (Beij ing Organization Committee for Olympic 
As Professor Wang is a very busy person, 1 am very appreciate that he gave me your 
contact and thank you very much for saving some time for my interview. So can you 
please help me solve a few questions that 1 encountered in my case study of the Bird 
Nest Project? 
Yes, of course, l'Il be very glad to help you. As for the Bird Nest Proj ect, we have 
already collected sorne of data from the managers who participated in the management of 
this project, both from the public and private sectors. Based on the data, we have been 
analyzi ng the main problems in the management of the project and trying to sort out sorne 
so lutions so that we can improve our management of such kind of ppp projects in C hina in 
the future. And 1 was informed by Professor Wang about your questionnaire di stributed to 
some of the managers in this project concerning the risk management, how was that going? 
We can perhaps exchange our research result than. 
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» Quesfion 3: Thank yo u very much of being so kind. My questionnaire survey is about 
the ri sk factors ' identification and all ocation of the Bird Nest Project. Before that, 1 may 
need sorne more detailed information about the project itself in order to prepare for the 
questions in my questionnaire . l've been trying to collecting as much as 1 can on the 
Internet and newspapers, but still seems not enough so far. Firstly, can you please talk 
about the sources of fi nance for the Bird Nest Project and how it was financed between 
the two sectors, the public and the private? 
A functional authority Beijing Development Planning Commiss ion (BSAMC) 
authorized by Beijing Municipal Government (BMG), on behalf of the public sector, signed 
the Agreement with the Private Consortium, which is form ed by three companies CITIC, 
BUCGC, and GSHGC after the Consortium won the tender of the Bird Nest Project; and 
th en they set up a Project Company jointly with Beijing State Owned Assets Management 
Corporation who acted as the representati ve of the BMG. After a few rounds of 
negotiations , the Private Consortium agreed to invest more and hold about 8% more 
proportion in the Proj ect Company. Thc final proportions of the shareholder are: I3SAMC, 
the public sector undeliook 58% of the proportions of the project, whi le the rest 42% was 
shared by three private companies in the Private Consortium . The total fund of the Bird 
Nest Project is coming fro m: the government contribution of 181 5.40 million yuan (58%), 
equity capital from the Private Consortium of 394.38 million yuan (12.6%), and loan from 
bank of 920.22 million yuan (29.4%). The Project Company was confident in raising the 
required 920.22 million yuan from the domestic commercial banks because the domestic 
commercial banks with good capacity in both domestic and foreign currencies had shown 
strong interest in the Bird Nest Project. 
» Question 4: With such a large amount of bank loans, even more than the funds from the 
Private Consortium? Did the Project Company finall y get the loan fro m the domestic 
commercial banks? Were there any difficulti es in requiring the loan from the domestic 
commercial banks? 
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Actuall y, as 1 mentioned in the previous questi on, the Private Consortium was onl y 
willingly to share a small part of funds needed in the total investment since this is a large-
scale project and the ri sk in finance is comparati ve ly high. T he private Consortium had 
worries about whether they can get their investment back and even make some profi ts 
thro ugh thi s project during the 30 years ' concession period. Meanwhil e, due to the same 
reason of a shortage of funds, the government was badl y in need of the pri vate partner ' s 
fi nancial support. ln the bidding process, the government had had a hard time in choos ing a 
proper private partner which could provide the best financial support . The most two 
competi tive bidders are the CITIC Consortium and the BCEG Consortium. Originally, the 
government was about to choose the BCEG as they offered a higher sharing of proport ions 
than the CLTIC. But due to so rne di sputes and argues among the shareholders in the BCEG 
Consorti um itse lf, the government had to negotiate with the CITIC Consortium to see if 
they could share a bit more. Finall y, the CLTIC agreed to undertake a 1.24% of the 
prûportions and the l'est funds shou[d come From [oan and the Pri vate 
Consortium was required to be the main borrower of the Joan. The bank loan is senior debt 
with tenor of 16 years with , 6 years of grace period, 5.184% as the interest rate, and 
drawdown period of 4 years. The principal of the repayment should be repaid in equal 
installments on quarterl y basis from 20 10, while interests should be paid on quatie rl y basis 
from fi rst drawdown. Before the tende ring process, the Project Company had got the letter 
of cornmitment from three domes tic commercial banks, including the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, China Constructi on Bank and CITIC lndustrial Bank of China. 
The prob lem that occurred in the loan ing process was that, when the three do mestic 
commercial banks noticed the cance llati on of the retractable roof event and the Project 
Company might be co st overrun, they were hesitating over the Project Company's payback 
ab ility. This was the reason why the government and the banks required the C ITIC 
consorti um, composed of three large companies (CITIC, BUCGC and GSHGC) as 
shareholders, to replace the Project Company as the borrower of the loan. 
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).- Question 5: How the government showed their special support for thi s project to attract 
the private investors and finally persuaded the Private Consortium to take more 
responsibly in the project? 
To ensure the success of the big event 2008 Beijing Olympics with a worldwide 
influence, our central government, as well as the Beijing Municipal Government (BMG) 
had shown their great supports and incentives by enacting a set of preferential policies in 
taxation and special regulations in the form of contracts and agreements. Firstly, as there is 
no BOT/PPP law in China, a series of government policies are enacted by Chinese central 
government and the BMG so as to meet its obligations for or provide incentives to the 
National Stadium. For example, the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of 
Taxation and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued on Jan 23 , 2003 the 
"Notices on Taxation relevant to the 29th Olympic Games" in which a lot of tax incentives 
are provided including that ail imp0l1ed equipment for the Stadium are free of custom and 
value added tax, and most of sales relevant to the Stadium are waived, etc. Besides, the 
BMG also enacts some other policies and requires coordination of its departments for the 
project. For example , the "Tendering Regulations for Concession of Urban Infrastructure 
Projects in Beijing" and the "Concession Regulations for Urban Infrastructure Proj ects in 
Beijing" implemented by BMG on Sept 1, 2006 and March l , 2006 (trail version on Oct l , 
2003) respectively; the "Some Suggestions (36 clauses) on Developing Private Economy" 
issued by the State Council on Feb 24, 2005 encouraging private investment in 
infrastructure using project finance. Secondly, some special regulations and rules were set 
in the agreements with the Private Consortium to facilitate the implementation of the 
Stadium in PPP mode, which were: 
1) BMG provides land at very low co st (1040 yuan per square meter for gross land 
development) . This is really a quite low price compared to the 10,000 yuan per 
square meter for other land nearby. 
2) BMG contributes l.8154 billion RMB, 58% of total investment (3.13 billion 
yuan) but will not get any dividend. 
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3) BMG provides necessary infrastructure (water, electric and road etc) connection 
to the site and ail other help and convenience fo r the constructi on and operati on 
of the Stadium. For example, fo r easy shipping on road large steel structure 
components fo r the Stadium, the BMG has issued a special passport to the 
Project Company. 
4) During the Test CompetitionslEvents and the Olympic Games, Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the Games of XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) will pay 
fees to the Project Company. BMG will also undertake ail expense of special 
equipment used fo r the opening and closing ceremonies as the equipment cannot 
be used for daily operation after the Game. 
5) During the concession period, BMG will not permit to develop new competiti ve 
stadium or to expand any existing competiti ve stadium in northern area of 
Beijing. 
~ Question 6: How the Project Company functioned in the management of the Bird Nest 
Project and where its revenues mainly came from? 
The Project Company undertook the responsibility of the Bird est National 
Stadium's fi nance, des ign work, as weil as the construction, operati on and mai ntenance of 
the project during the concession peri od. During the Ol ympics' period, the onl y source of 
the Project Company' s income was the stadium 's renting fees coming from the Beij ing 
Organizing Committee for the Games of XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) fo r the use of holding 
ail test competitions, test events and the Olympic Games. In the des ign pl an of the stadi um, 
80,000 sq uare meters of building area was desi gned for the commercial use with 1,000 
parking pl aces, 11 0 corporate boxes, 2 Chinese restaurants and 2 Western restaurants, a 
membership hote l with 70 rooms, and another 40,000 square meters for the construction of 
a large super-market. During the concession period, counted from December 3 l , 2006 to 
December 31,203 8 (the Olympic period August 8, 2008 to August 24, 2008 excluded), the 
137 
Project Company can make profits from vanous business act ivities, including 
advertisement, sponsorship, franchise , renting spaces such as parking lots, restaurants, 
hotels in and around the stadium, entrance tickets sale, sport competitions, art performance 
and concerts , the selling of the naming ri ght, as weil as revenues from various media such 
as television, radio and Internet. 
» Question 7: Were there any disputed and disagreements among the private partners in 
the Private Consortium? How they shared their profits and risks encountered in the 
project and how they achieved a balance among themselves, as weil as with the 
government as the public sector? 
Yes, the disputes were unavoidable in such a large-scale project, not only among the 
private partners themselves, but also between the private and the public sectors. Firstly, the 
total profit of the project's construction is divided into three parts which made the share of 
the profit di spersed the Project Consortium's control over the project's construction and 
caused di vergences on decision-making. Secondly, the BUCGC, as the general contractor 
for the project, who undertakes the most responsibility of design work and the construction, 
had put its emphasis more on its own profits, time and safety more than that for the overall 
project. Thi s led to the cost overrun and time delay for the stadium ' s construction. Thirdly, 
the Private Consortium had also a few disagreements with the government as weIl. The 
government concerned more for the successfull y holding of the Olympie Games and a good 
pub li c influence whereas the Private Consortium put more emphas is on their own 
commercial interests. Take the canceling of the retractable roof for example, the BMG 
agreed with the cancell ation because it was not only economica l but also built a good 
publi c reputation with a symbol of "Host the Olympie Games Frugally". But obviously, the 
Private Consortium was not happy with this decision since this not on ly led to a 
construction cost overrun and time de lay, but also reduced the Bird Nest Stadium ' s brand 
value since the unique and symboli c retractable roof was cut otT which would detinitely 
made the stadium far less attractive to various business act ivities and investments. AlI these 
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problems and disputes caused the risks OCC LU" in the project which made the proper ri sk 
management very mu ch critical fo r the well -operating of the projec t. However, bo th the 
government and the Private Consortium had tried hard to balance the sharing of the ri sk and 
put the project 's own efficiency their top priority. In order to so lve the disputed and 
disagreements, negoti ati ons and re-negotiati ons made among the private partners and with 
the government were a good method. With ail these coordination and cooperation between 
the publ ic and the private sectors, solutions were finally found and the stad ium was fi nished 
in time fo r the Olympics. 
~ Question 8: Speaking of the ri sks, what do yo u think are the mam ri sk factors in 
Chi na ' s ppp projects? And how should the ri sks be assessed and are there any measures 
to mi tigate the risks encountered in the pp p projects? 
As far as J am concerned, above a1l is the legislati on risk. The investors should firstly 
weil learn the regulati ons, poli cies, and related rule of the country or the region where the 
projects take place; than the reliability of the local government is another risk to be 
considered . Normally the government with hi gher leve l and more powers is more re li able . 
Before starting the project, the investors should make sure that the project comply with a1l 
re lated regulat ions and poli cies in the country; bes ides there may be ri sks regarding the 
market demand, interest rate, exchange rate, projects' finance risk, inflation ri sk, majeure 
force etc. 
ln order to mitigate the risks such as inflation, fl oating of prices , sorne protection 
measures coul d be set in the contracts and agreements. Fo r example, the price adjustment 
could be adopted to avoid the inflation risk; the total price could be fix ed in the contrac t so 
that the risk of changes of the raw material pr ice could be transferred to the des ign and 
construction companies. Bes ides, some compensation rules could be set in the contracts in 
order to balance the risk allocation between ail parties. For example, a threshold of the to tal 
profit could be fixed with a buffering account fo r the project, if the actual profi ts from the 
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project IS higher than the thres hold, the ex tra profi ts could be added to the buffering 
acco unt; on the con trary, when the profits cannot meet the threshold, the fund s in the 
buffer ing account could be used to make a compensation. 
~ Question 9: For the developing countries as China, should the government take more 
responsibilities of the ri sks in the ppp proj ects? 
WeIl thi s large ly depends on the proj ect itse lf and the characteri stics of the project. In 
deve loping countries, take China for example, some ri sks, su ch as Expropriati on and 
Nationalization, are the risks that the Private Consortium could hardly do anything to 
control them . The government should take ail responsibiliti es of thi s kind of ri sks. For other 
risks like market ri sk, design risk, construction and operati on ri sk, the Private Consortium 
are more capable of controlling them so that those ri sk should be more allocated to the 
private sector. There are al so sorne risks should be shared between the public and the 
private sectors, such as force majeure, natural ri sks etc . The sharing of ri sks should be 
arranged through a negotiation between the partners instead of simply leave ail 
responsibilities to the government. In fact, in China ' s ex isted ppp projects, the ri sks such as 
the local government 's re liability, quotation ri sk aroused due to the unfair regulations in the 
initi al contract. Thus, the signing of a fair and reasonable ppp contract and strictly fo llow 
the rul e set in the contract is very important. Plus a reasonab le method of risk allocation 
and sorne adj usting and compensating measures should also be included in the contract. 
~ Question JO: And in order to get involved in PPP projects in China, do you think there 
existed sorne unfai r competitions between the state-owned enterpri ses and the pri vate 
enterpri ses? 
To be honest, the market-ori ented state-owned enterprises are sti ll the main force in 
the fie ld of the infrastructu re constructi on proj ects, in whi ch the PPP mode is often 
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adopted. According to the recent ppp projects, most of the bidders who won the tendering 
fo r a ppp project are state-owned enterpri ses, espec ia ll y for the proj ect with a long li fe 
cycle and that req ui res more funds inves ted. However the only criteri on fo r the gove rnment 
to choose the private pati ner is "effi c iency", there indeed ex isted so rne unfa irness in the 
tendering process due to an asymmetric financing enviromuent and market cond itions 
which are typical of China. We could only depend on the government to voluntarily take 
sorne measures against such kincl of unfa irness. For example, improve and perfect the 
re levant laws and regulations make the tendering process open, fair and equitable, 
accelerating the restructuring of state-owned enterpri ses etc . Actuall y, our govermuent has 
already made sorne amendments in the re lated laws and regul ation . In 2005, a new rule has 
been added in China's economic laws, which marked : " private capital is legally allowed to 
enter the monopoly industries in China, such as e lectricity, telecommuni cati ons, ra il ways, 
civ il aviation, petroleum as well as other fields." 
~ Question 11 : And what do you think are the advantages for the state-owned enterprises 
fo r the China's ppp projects which make them more competitive than private 
enterprises? There is so rne say ing assumed that for the state-owned enterprises in the 
ppp project, they are just using the state's money to fin ance the project, and even they 
got budget defic its, they are only transferring their loss in the loan fro m banks. What's 
yo ur op inion over thi s? Do yo u agree with that? 
Weil , fi rst of all , the state-owned enterprises are much more capabl e in fi nancing and 
have much more experience in the management of infrastructure projects. W ith the 
invisible support of govenuuent behind their backs, the state-owned enterpri ses are more 
powerful in negotiating and setting rules in the contract. In another word , they have more 
contro l over sorn e certain ri sks; whereas the private enterpri ses are comparatively weak in 
fïnancing and have fewer sources for financing; meanwhile they lack the experience in 
managmg large-scale infrastructure projects and they have less power in the decis ion 
making. 
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For the state-owned enterpri ses' financing problem, l don't completely agree with the 
saying. Firstl y, not ail funds are coming From the state-owned banks. There are other 
sources for the ppp project ' s financin g, such as capital markets , foreign aid loans, public 
funding agencies, international financial institutions etc .; secondly, for most of the ppp 
projects, whether the borrower is state-owned enterprise or no t, once the project turned out 
to be a failure, the lender can only require the repayment with a limited range. Therefore, 
the lender focused more on the project itself, including the proj ect's feasibility and 
profitability, rather th an the whether the borrower is state-owned enterprise or private 
enterprise. Besides, the lender will also adopt the insurance method or third-party guarantee 
to transfer part of the financial risk. 
~ Question J 2: The private enterprises normally participate in the tendering for a ppp 
project in the form of a pri vate consortium which is consisted of several private 
enterpri ses . How should they choose proper partners in order to win the bidding? 
Accord ing to the recent ppp projects in Beijing, the winners in the bidding have one 
thing in common, which is the consortiums are ail made of three companies. This is 
actually res ulted from the project's own feature . Take a ppp power proj ect for example; the 
best combination of the consortium is made of: 1. a state-owned enterprise which takes 
control over the local power grid ; 2. foreign partners which can provide funds and 
experience in operating and managing the power project; 3. private enterpri se who can offer 
ski ll s in design and equipment 's supply chain. In a word, the principle for choosing the 
bidding partners is to choose the ones with complementary advantages. Besides, in order to 
avo id disputes after the bidding, sorne principles should be settled among the private 
partners before the tendering process. 
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